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Chapter 1
Introduction
Standard incentive theory assumes that choices of an agent depend only on his own
monetary payoff. Thus, agents are considered selfish payoff maximizers who act in
their own material interest. Consequently, a principal who plans to change agents’
behavior can do that just by changing monetary payoffs because no other variable
play a role in agents’ behavior. This is what incentive theory calls price effect and,
for decades, economic theorists have considered it the only tool capable of changing
economic agents’ choices.
But in the last few decades a new field of the economic theory, called behav-
ioral economics, have stormed into the scene1. The focus of research in behavioral
economics is on individual choice and motives underlying that choice. Behavioral
economics is organized around experimental findings that suggest inadequacies of
standard economic theories. Much of the behavioral economics builds on experimen-
tal evidence in which a new variable that it is neglected by standard economic theory
is shown to “matter”.
In their seminal work Güth et al. (1982) showed that responders in ultimatum
bargaining game experiments2, routinely reject small offers and therefore do not
1 See for instance Bowles (1998), Rabin (1998), Camerer et al. (2004) and DellaVigna (2009).
2 The ultimatum bargaining game consists in two players that bargains anonimously to divide a
fixed amount between them. Proposer offers a division of the pie. Responder decides whether to
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maximize their selfish monetary payoff as standard models of economics predict.
This result has been confirmed by a large number experiments using the ultima-
tum bargaining game in different contexts.3 Seeking for an explanation, behavioral
economists started to develop theoretical models introducing new variables used to
parameterize deviations from these standard models4. Thus is how the branch of
Social Preferences emerged within behavioral economics.
Literature on social preferences tries to explain and measure the impact of non-
selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. In particular, behavioral
economics has been approached to the study of incentives trying to find out the psy-
chological foundations which shape them, (Fehr and Falk (2002)). This dissertation
aims to be a step forward in this approach. In this thesis work two innovations
from the standard models of principal-agent are proposed. Identity (chapter 2) and
Intrinsic Motivation (chapter 3) are incorporated into the standard models of prin-
cipal agent and their effects studied in a dynamic setting. These two innovations are
therefore a contribution to developing richer models ‘[. . . ] that may become part of
the ‘behavioral contract theory’.” [Fehr et al. (2007), p. 152.].
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 give rise to new interesting and possibly relevant new
hypotheses that can be tested empirically. The behavioral assumptions incorporated
into the models of chapter 2 and chapter 3 are also other interesting issues that
should be object of empirical testing. Chapter 4 is a pilot inquiry on incentives,
intrinsic motivation and crowding effects5 being an attempt to test empirically some
accept it or to reject it. If accepted both player gets their agreed upon shares. If rejected players
receive nothing.
3 See Camerer (2003)
4 See Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfelds (2000).
5 By crowding effects, the literature on intrinsic motivation means the interplay between intrinsic
motivation and extrinsic incentives. Extrinsic incentives may hurt intrinsic motivation (crowding-
out) or may improve intrinsic motivation (crowding-in). For a review see Bowles and Polanía-Reyes
(2012).
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of the behavioral assumptions and new hypotheses coming from chapter 3, using
qualitative methods6 and semi-structured interviews a-la-Bewley7.
1.1 Identity and Incentives in Public Organizations
Organizations that provide collective goods pursue goals and objectives, which are
not necessarily monetary profitable. Usually the motivation of the employees who
work within these organizations goes beyond the expected monetary gain. In general
terms, people who work in the provision of collective goods sector have a self-view
as pro-social agents. They share organizational goals and objectives and thus they
cohere with managers and policy makers in what Wilson (1989) called mission.
A “mission” is a single culture that is widely and enthusiastically shared by
the members of the organization. Wilson (1989, p. 99)
Bureaucrats have preferences. Among them is the desire to do the job.
That desire may spring entirely out of a sense of duty, or it may arise out of a
willingness to conform to the expectations of fellow workers and superiors even
when there is no immediate financial advantage in doing so. Wilson (1989, p.
156).
If motivations beyond the monetary contribute in drawing the way of public
workers’ behavior, then non-monetary incentives should be incorporated to motivate
them. In many of the most productive firms there have been attempts to substitute
monetary incentives with the culture of mission, Wilson (1989).
In business where one might suppose that money incentives are the whole
story, great efforts have been made by the most productive firms to supple-
6 See Corbin and Strauss (2008).
7 See Bewley (1999, 2002).
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ment those incentives with a sense of mission based on a shared organizational
culture. Wilson (1989, 157).
Then, mission preferences and other non-monetary or non-economic workers’ mo-
tivations might lead them to high quality work, high degree of implication, effort
culture, and identification with the organization’s objectives.
In line with Wilson (1989) approach, Kreps (1990) led a new branch of the litera-
ture on organizational theory named Corporate Culture. In his seminal work, Kreps
(1990), treats the corporate culture as a principle that helps to identify the firm’s
rule of behavior. The rule helps setting a good reputation that may be used to gen-
erate confidence to potential future trading partners. In Kreps (1990) view, culture
“[. . . ] gives hierarchical inferiors an idea ex-ante how the organization will react to
circumstances as they arise; in strong sense, it gives identity to the organization.” .
Other relevant works from Corporate Culture literature8 also have approached
the question of how a good culture, shared by all the members of an organization,
may be a powerful motivator different from the monetary rewards.
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) consider this sharing-goals behavior of agents as
Identity. In their words, identity, is “a way to motivate employees, different than
incentives from monetary compensation” and also believe that “[. . . ] a change in
identity is the ideal motivator if, [. . . ] the effort of a worker is either hard to observe
or hard to reward” .
Identity in economics of organizations and public workers’ motivation is an issue
in the recent economic literature 9. Identity may alter the economic behavior of
workers’ because it acts as a workers’ internal non-material motivator. Thus, in the
8 Barney (1986), Schein (1986), Crémer (1993), Lazear (1995), Tirole (1996), Carrillo and Gromb
(1999), Carrillo and Gromb (2007), Hermalin (2001) and, Rob and Zemsky (2002)
9 The effects of identity on economic decisions have been analyzed also by Sen (1985), Wilson
(1989), Akerlof and Kranton (2005), Akerlof and Kranton (2008), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Ghatak
and Mueller (2011), Prendergast (2007) and Prendergast (2008).
4
provision of collective goods where workers’ self-view as pro-social agents plays an
important role, the design of optimal incentives may differ from the private sector
where the weight of economic motives is higher.
Identity is related with person’s self-image: how people think about they and the
others should behave10. In an organization, identity is the extent to which agents
share organizational goals and objectives. At public organizational level, identity is a
measure of how accurately workers identify themselves with the organization mission
or goal of providing social valuable goods. Identity is the internalization of a culture
by all the members of an organization and culture can be seen as the organizational
goal or mission.
In this thesis the concept of culture is integrated within identity. Identity means
that workers’ share organizational goals. Culture is interpreted as a situation in which
identity becomes a stable behavior rule for all the members of the organization: ‘to
behave pro-socially exerting high effort at workplace’, for instance. Thus identity
can lead all the members of an organization to exert high effort with the goal of
producing and providing to the society with the highest possible amount of socially
valuable goods and services at the highest possible quality.
The economic literature has analyzed the role of workers’ identity and its conse-
quences within firms. But economics has not explained how this identity affects to
organizational outcomes and decisions when the organization (principal) may alter
workers’ (agents) identity. There is a lack of research that incorporates the pro-
cess of changing identity principal-agent games. Akerlof and Kranton (2005), for
instance, point out the possibility of changing agents identity as a way that allows
organizations to get economic benefits. But they, neither formalize this process nor
incorporate it into their model.
10 See Sen (1985), Akerlof and Kranton (2005) and Akerlof and Kranton (2008).
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Trying to move a step forward from the literature, a model in which workers’
identity may be altered as a result of socialization is proposed in this work. So-
cialization is the process through which organizations can change workers’ identity.
As a result of socialization, workers’ goals and organization’s goals get aligned. By
contrast, conflict will be the process that lead workers to completely disagree with
organizational goals. Socialization can be launched by organization’s managers car-
rying out certain investments and actions which promote a sense of mission, shared
culture, or common objectives through and among workers.
In this thesis the effects of workers’ identity in the economics of organizations
are analyzed. Chapter 2 presents a principal-agent model in which the possibility to
influence public workers’ (agents) identity with the use of incentives is introduced.
We assume that including some motivational investments in contracts, public orga-
nizations may affect positively their employees’ identity.
1.2 Intrinsic Motivation and Incentives in Health
Care Organizations
Doctors working in public health systems are usually intrinsically motivated agents
who get satisfaction from the very act of doing their work. As it is shown in Bowles
and Polanía-Reyes (2012), there are motives such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic
pleasure in helping others and ethical commitments, inducing people to help oth-
ers more than a self-interested profit-maximizer individual would be willing to do.
Teachers, doctors, firefighters, policemen and social workers are other good examples
of such intrinsically motivated workers11. We use the term “intrinsic motivation” to
refer to doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable like in Deci
and Ryan (1985) and Deci and Ryan (2000a). In health care, intrinsic motivation
11 See for example Benabou and Tirole (2003), Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Ghatak and Mueller
(2011).
6
refers to doctors’ willingness to exert effort performing in medical activities that are
of non-material interest like research, teaching, further education, health prevention
activities or clinical management.
A new branch of contract theory investigates optimal contracts and incentives
when agents are intrinsically motivated and when incentives beyond the money
work12. Dewatripont et al. (1999a) explore the effects of implicit incentives in the
form of career concerns. Murdock (2002) shows that in presence of implicit con-
tracts, the firm can commit to implement some financially non-profitable projects
with positive intrinsic value for the agent because doing that, agents will respond
putting high effort to generate more projects and increasing the expected returns of
the firm.
Another body of the literature analyzes the effects of having motivated agents in
public organizations or in private organizations that serve collective goods13. Wil-
son (1989) explains how in the collective goods provision agencies, incentives are
supplemented with a sense of mission based on a shared organizational culture. In
Ghatak and Mueller (2011) organizations can reduce incentive payments when they
contract intrinsically motivated agents. Thus, an organization that adopts the non-
for-profit status will attract motivated workers and will benefit from paying agents
lower efficiency wages. Dewatripont et al. (1999b) show that specialization and pro-
fessionalization of organizations raises the incentives of agents and create a sense of
mission. They point out that “this paradigm can be fruitfully expanded, for example
to a dynamic perspective where effort choices are repeated and where the evolution of
mission design can be analyzed (p. 216)” . The above literature incorporates intrin-
sic motivation and the importance of the non-monetary incentives in principal-agent
12 See Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), Dewatripont et al. (1999a), Murdock (2002) and Prendergast
(2008).
13 See Besley and Ghatak (2005), Francoise (2000), Francoise (2003) and Prendergast (2007).
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models. However, all these works have neglected the well established fact that in-
centives affect intrinsic motivation.
Psychologists14 and behavioural economists15, argue that under some specific
conditions incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation of agents. The crowding-out
effect is one of the most important anomalies in economics, and acts in a manner
opposite to the fundamental economic ‘law’ that raising monetary incentives increases
supply16. Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) classify the mechanisms accounting for
crowding out. Our framework deals with three of these mechanisms: the informative
value of incentives about principal’s intentions or type, the compromise of agents’
self determination or control aversion, and the agents’ preferences updating process.
However crowding-in can also occur, as shown in Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012)
and Deci and Ryan (2000a). In sixteen out of the fifty experiments surveyed in
Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) they found evidence of crowding-in showing that
well designed fines, subsidies, and the like, make incentives and intrinsic motivation
complements rather than substitutes.
In this thesis, however, it is assumed that principals in health care are primarily
focused on health benefits. They focus heavily upon improving certain health perfor-
mance measures that are easily observable by the electorate: for instance reducing the
amount of time spent on waiting lists, increasing the number of operations conducted
for common pathologies, increasing the infrastructure, buying new technology assets,
reducing costs and saving resources, and enlarging the range of services supplied. In
contrast, physicians’ goals are focused toward patients, a subset of all tax-payers, and
also they have other interests in clinical and medical research, teaching and further
education that taken together form what is called the doctors’ “mission”.
14 See DeCharms (1968), Deci (1971), Deci and Ryan (1985) and Deci et al. (1999).
15 See Benabou and Tirole (2003), Bowles (2008), Frey (1997) and Frey and Jegen (2001)
16 See Benabou and Tirole (2003), Benabou and Tirole (2006), Bowles (2008), Bowles and Polanía-
Reyes (2012), Frey and Jegen (2001) and Gneezy et al. (2011) for a review on Crowding-out effect.
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One key fact of the approach presented in chapter 3 is that incentives may make
the action of providing health a less convincing signal of a doctors’ intrinsic motiva-
tion resulting in observers interpreting some generous acts, as merely self-interested.
This may crowd out doctors intrinsic motivation and they could shift from an ethi-
cal to a payoff maximizing frame, as in Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Bowles and
Polanía-Reyes (2012).
The contribution of the approach proposed in the thesis is threefold: first, fol-
lowing Dewatripont et al. (1999a) research program, a dynamical principal-agent
model with intrinsically motivated agents and repeated effort and incentives choices
is presented, to analyze the evolution of optimal contracts; second, crowding effects
are incorporated in this dynamic model; and third, the proposed dynamical setting
allows to endogenize changes in doctors’ preferences in response to the principal ac-
tions and therefore to evaluate how optimal contracts evolve and affect the outcomes
of the game.
1.3 Intrinsic Motivation, Crowding Effects and In-
centives in the Field: a Case of Study in the Ser-
vicio Navarro de Salud-Osasunbidea (SNS-
O)
As stated above in this chapter, recent theoretical and empirical literature in eco-
nomics has shown that economic agents act beyond the self-interest and have other
motivations than the pure monetary. Contrary to the standard economic model
starred by the homo economicus, a vast experimental, empirical and theoretical lit-
erature on Behavioral Economics17 has shown that motives like social preferences
17 For a depth review see Camerer (2003), Camerer et al. (2004), Fehr and Falk (2002) and Frey
(1997).
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18, intrinsic motivation19, or corporate culture (identity, social norms, values and
ethics)20 among others, play a key role in the economic decisions of economic agents.
However, mainstream contract theory and the theory of incentives have neglected
the role of such motivations21. The study of contract incompleteness and optimal
incentives has based on the standard economic assumptions of economic behavior.
Thus economic theory on adverse selection and moral hazard in organizations has
generated a wide range of results many of which failed in their predictions in contexts
where motivations beyond the maximization of the economic profits emerge22.
It is well established that social organizations23 pursue goals and objectives which
are not necessarily profitable in monetary terms (Wilson (1989)). Moreover, usually
the motivation of agents who work for these organizations goes beyond the expected
monetary gain. They are social agents, intrinsically motivated for work and with
a strong self view as pro-social agents. They enjoy from simply doing the work
and view themselves as a part of a whole system that seeks to maximize the social
welfare providing education, health care, public services and so on. Thus monetary
incentives implemented in accordance with the standard economic theory might not
work properly because agents’ behavior is also shaped by other motives in addition
to the monetary and material ones.
However, despite the huge amount of theoretical and experimental work, the lack
18 See for instance Benabou and Tirole (2006), Bowles (1998) and Fehr et al. (2007).
19 See Benabou and Tirole (2003), Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012), Deci and Ryan (2000a), Deci
and Ryan (1985) and Frey and Jegen (2001).
20 See Akerlof and Kranton (2005), Carrillo and Gromb (1999), Crémer (1993), Hermalin (2001),
Kreps (1990), Lazear (1995), Rob and Zemsky (2002), Schein (1986) and Sen (1985).
21 Dixit (2002).
22 See for instance Fehr et al. (2007), Ghatak and Mueller (2011), LeGrand (2006) and Prendergast
(2007).
23 We will refer as social organizations to those organizations which are state or publicly owned
and whose goal is to provide a collective good like health, education, social services, civil safety,
emergency services.
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of empirical and field research and also the lack of natural experiments leave behav-
ioral economics unbalanced in its approach to the Economics of Organizations and
Incentives. There are some contributions that approach the topic empirically24; but,
as a discipline, there is a lack of empirical support of the new theoretical predictions,
and also of the experimental findings. Our work is aimed at throwing some light in
this empirical test of theoretical implications on the topic. Specifically, we aim to
test the theoretical implications drawn from chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis which are
summarized in Berdud et al. (2014a,b). Given the inherent difficulty to obtain data
about intrinsic motivation, identity and related concepts, we relied upon Qualitative
Research methods.
The chapter 4 of this thesis is aimed at seeking empirical evidence from the
field, useful to improve existing theories on the topic and/or develop new theory on
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Contract Theory. More precisely, the objective
is twofold: first, we aim to find evidence in the field about intrinsic motivation and
second, we aim to find evidence about how these motivations affect agents’ decisions
and attitudes towards work through crowding effects.
Research is framed into health care organizations where, presumably, agents
(physicians) are intrinsically motivated to work in the provision of health. More
precisely, the hypotheses that we are seeking to test are the following: (1) Doctors
are intrinsically motivated agents, (2) Economic incentives and control and com-
mand policies may crowd out doctors’ intrinsic motivation and (3) There are other
incentives that may crowd in agents intrinsic motivation.
Finding confirmatory evidence on the above hypotheses may help us to inform
decision makers about the optimal design of incentives, regulations and policies which
will lead to better outcomes. Paraphrasing the words of Gnezzy and List (2013)
“Once we understand what people value and why, we can develop effective incentives
24 See Stern (2004), Batifoulier et al. (2009) or Kolstad (2013)
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and use them to [. . . ], motivate employees” (doctors). We forecast that in the case
of health these better outcomes could lead to an improvement in the efficiency and
the effectiveness with which health services are provided and to improvement in the
quality of health services.
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Chapter 2
Identity, Incentives and Motivational
Capital in Public Organizations
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapter, identity has become an issue in the recent
economic literature o economics of organizations and public workers’ motivation.
Identity may alter the economic behavior of workers’ because it acts as an internal
non-material motivatorof workers. Thus, in the provision of collective goods sector
where workers’ self-view as pro-social agents plays an important role, the design of
optimal incentives may differ from the private sector where the weight of economic
motives is higher.
At public organizational level, identity is a measure of how accurately workers
identify themselves with the organization mission or goal of providing social valuable
goods. In the present chapter identity means that workers share organizational goals.
Thus identity can lead all the members of an organization to exert high effort in order
to produce socially valuable goods and services.
The economic literature has analyzed the role of workers’ identity and its conse-
quences within firms. But economics has not explained how this identity affects to
organizational outcomes and decisions when the organization (principal) may alter
13
workers’ (agents) identity. There is a lack of research that incorporates the process
of changing identity principal-agent games. In Akerlof and Kranton (2005), for in-
stance, they point out the possibility of changing agents identity as a way that allows
organizations to get economic benefits. But authors, neither formalize this process
nor incorporate it into their model.
In the game proposed in this chapter workers’ identity may be altered as a result
of socialization. Socialization is the process through which organizations can change
workers’ identity. As a result of socialization, workers’ and organization’s goals and
objectives get aligned.
Socialization can be launched by organization’s managers carrying out certain in-
vestments and actions which promote a sense of mission, shared culture, or common
objectives through and among workers. This approach allows us to measure what
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) call as motivational capital. That is, the current value of
the stream of the expected costs saved by the organization when the principal invests
a given amount of resources to improve workers’ identity. Using the value of motiva-
tional capital, we can establish the conditions under which firms and organizations
might benefit from investing in motivational capital.
In the following sections of this chaper the effects of workers’ identity in the
economics of organizations are analyzed, under the frame of a principal-agent re-
lationship, with the aim to answer the following questions: Can workers’ identity
be considered another productive asset of public organizations? If so, how should
public organizations’ managers design incentive schemes in order to benefit from this
Motivational Capital? Then, could identity be the key to avoid shirking in public
organizations?
14
2.2 The Model
We want to analyze the optimality of contracts in a principal agent model in which
the principal may provoke changes in agents’ identity through incentives and identity
investments. We want to capture in the model whether the possibility of changing
agents’ identity may influence optimal incentive contracts. In the present section
we define the game and solve it. Then we make comparative statics to draw some
results.
2.2.1 Players’ Preferences and Utilities.
There are two players in the game: the agent A and the principal P1. We assume
that A can develop identity. We also restrict the analysis to linear contracts.
We model a finite period t = 0; 1; :::; T; ::: principal-agent dynamical game where
the agents’ effort is private information. Agents’ behaviour is affected by identity.
We incorporate identity into A’s utility function. Identity is a non-monetary source
of motivation that affects agents’ preferences. Identity also can be altered or changed
by principal’s choices.
Principal
In our model there is a performance measure qt that P wants to optimize in each
t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : . Performance qt is a function of As’ effort et 2 fe; eg. Assume
that qt 2 fq; qg where q > q; interpret q as P ’s target on performance level and q
as a fail in this target. Let p(qt = qjet) = i be the probability of high performance
conditional to A’s effort choice. We use i = 0; 1 to label low and high effort: 0
means low effort e and 1 means high effort e. Then p(qt = qjet = e) = 1 will be
1 Often we use she and he to refer to the agent and the principal respectively, as conventionally
the principal agent literature does.
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the probability of high performance when the agent decides to exert high effort, and
p(qt = qjet = e) = 0 the probability of high performance when the agent decides to
exert low effort. Alternatively p(qt = qjet = 1) = 1  1 and p(qt = qjet = e) = 1  0
will be the probabilities of low performance when effort is high and low, respectively.
We assume that performance qt is an informative but noisy signal of et which means
that 1 > 0.
The principal may use monetary incentives  “carrots and sticks”  or non-monetary
incentives  “identity investments”  to maximize qt or performance. We assume that,
regardless agents shirk or not, P always expects higher profit from high performance
level. Formally,
i
 
Rt(qt)  ws0t

> (1  i)
 
Rt(qt)  w
s0
t

where s0 = f0; Sg and i = f0; 1g:
Despite qt is a target outcome for P it is not necessarily the only one for A. This
condition of disconnection may be the reason for using incentives in order to achieve
high performance.
Let Rt(qt) be a function which assigns a monetary value to the performance level2.
Rt(qt) is positively correlated with the achieved social welfare, the total amount of
the collective good or service delivered, and the sort of measures which are salient
and observable by the electorate, tax payers and political advisors to evaluate the
public supply of collective goods.
Let E[Rt(qt)ji] be the expected material rewards for P . Rewards depend on per-
formance qt. Performance is conditional to i. Let wt(qt) be the monetary payments
offered by P to A. Payments are contingent to performance. Let E[wt(qt)ji] be the
2 Usually for the firm this monetary value is determined by the market price and the quantity
sold. But in the case of the public provision of collective goods the absence of markets and market
prices makes hard to measure the monetary value of qt. We can interpret this function as one which
calculate the opportunity cost of public supplying rather than market supplying
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expected monetary payment that P offers to A which is also an expected monetary
cost for P . Let s0 be the total amount of resources invested to promote and change
A’s identity. Like any other investment, we assume that P faces an initial investment
cost of C0 = f0; Sg at t = 0. If P decides to make identity investments s0 = S, he
will face the future depreciation cost of such investments in the following periods.
We capture this depreciation cost stream with the cost function Ct(s0).
All the above describes P ’s expected profit function t for each period t that can
be written as,
t = E[Rt(qt)ji; t]  E[wt(qt)ji; t]  Ct(s0) (2.1)
In equation 2.1 the cost function Ct(s0) takes the value C0(S) = S in t = 0 and an
depreciation cost Ct(S) = S for every t > 1 at constant depreciation rate .
Agent
We represent the A’s preferences with the following expected utility function.
Ut = E[ut(wt(qt))ji]| {z }
Expected utility from income
   t(et;
Identityz }| {
t(s0))| {z }
Disutility from effort
(2.2)
The first term on the right hand side of the above utility function, E[ut(wt(qt))ji],
is the expected utility from money. The agent is risk averse, u0 > 0 and u00 < 0, and
the parameter i is the probability of high or low performance.
The second term on the right hand side of the expected utility function represents
the disutility from effort  t(et; t(s0)). The disutility from effort depends positively
on effort and negatively on t(s0) which is a function representing A’s identity. The
properties of the disutility from effort are summed up in the following set of assump-
tions.
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A1: The function  t(et; t(s0)) is continuous in the interval [; ].
A2: The function  t(et; t(s0)) is strictly decreasing in its second argument
when et = e. That is, @ t(e;t)@t jet=e < 0.
A3: When et = e, then  t(e; t) = 0; 8t 2 [; ].
A4: The function  t(et; t(s0)) is upper and lower bounded. Is lower bounded when
 t(e; t) = 0 8t, and  t(e; ) = 0. The function is upper bounded when
 t(e; ) = 	, with 	 2 R+.
The above assumptions ensure that, when identity converge to its upper (lower)
bound, then A’s disutility from doing high effort converges to zero (	). That is, the
agent does not suffer disutility from exerting high effort when she develops identity.
Contrary, when she has no identity, A experiences the maximum disutility from effort
and she only can diminish this disutility making low effort.
Agent’s Identity: Information
At the first period of the game, P learns As’ identity probability distribution F0(0)3.
P ’s action over s0 affects the A’s identity. Then, conditional to his identity invest-
ment choice s0 = f0; Sg, P have to update the As’ identity distribution Ft(tjs0) in
the subsequent periods of the game t = 1; :::; T; ::: where t 2 N.
2.2.2 The Game
The game is a repeated game with two players: the agent A, and the principal P . We
consider a recontracting game in which every period both players have to play again:
3 We consider a continuum of types of A, t 2 [; ] There is a possibility of switching As’ type
or identity making an investment in the starting period of the game. For a precise description of
the time evolution of the conditional distribution of types see the mathematical appendix.
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P must offer a new contract and A’s has to accept or reject the contract and choose
effort level. We analyze this repeated principal agent game with moral hazard, where
the choices made by the P affects A’s identity. Reciprocally these changes in identity
and motivation affect the contracts offered by P in the next period.
Timing
Each period the game consists of three stages: stage 0, stage 1, and stage 2. The
sequence of these stages in t = 0; 1; 2; ::: is graphically shown in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The timing of the game in two separate sequences, t = 0 and t = 1; 2; :::
The sequence of stages within each period t = 0; 1; 2; ::: is as described below:
(0): The principal P learns the distribution of As’ identity F0(0) in t = 0 or
updatesAs’ identity distribution Ft(tjs0) in t = 1; 2; ::: taking into account his choice
of s0 2 f0; Sg in t = 0. Then, P offers a contract conditional to the expected value
of A’s identity. The contract consists in a dupla of stochastic contingent payments
w0(q0) = fw;wg and the decision to invest or not in socialization s0 2 f0; Sg in
t = 0: fw0(q0); s0g. In t = 1; 2; : : : a contract consists in a dupla of stochastic
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contingent payments wt(qt) = fw;wg and the commitment of bearing the cost of
depreciation of the s0 2 f0; Sg investment, Ct(s0) = s0. We refer to this contract
with fwt(qt); Ct(s0)g.4
(1): A accepts or refuses the contract. If she accepts, then choose an action over
effort e0 2 fe; eg. Contrary, if she refuses then she gets her reservation utility U .
(2): Finally, output is realized qt 2 fq; qg. Stochastic contingent payment is
realized wt(qt) = fw;wg and payoffs t and Ut are realized.
Identity and Socialization
Agents only differ in their identity. For all of them, their skills and qualification for
work is the same. They are equally productive in the production of qt. Therefore,
P only deals with moral hazard because the differences in identity do not involve
any difference in agents’ ability for the production of q. A’s identity distribution is
assumed to be known by P .
Contracts and incentives offered by the principal may influence agent’s identity.
Agent’s identity can take a value within some closed interval  2 [; ], with  < 
and  2 R+. In the model higher identity means lower disutility from effort. Thus,
we can anticipate that an agent with higher identity needs less monetary incentives
to exert high effort. However, the only use of monetary incentives by the principal
will involve a higher amount of money offered to A period after period. This is so
because the agent will experience more disutility from effort as mean as she looses
his identity.
What we want to capture with the socialization process5 is P ’s ability to influence
4 The inclusion of the depreciation cost in every period into the contract, can be interpreted as
an instrument used by P to signal the nature of the incentives offered by him to exert effort from
agents: socialization incentives or pure economic transaction incentives.
5 See Adler and Borys (1996)
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and change agents’ identity carrying out investments in the organization which signal
support and awareness toward agents or workers. Activities, meetings and events or-
ganized by the organization to set its employees organizational minded, participation
of workers in organization’s decisions, to agree organizational objectives jointly with
workers, setting organization’s internal rules of behavior through democratic pro-
cesses, the design of workteams of employees to represent organization in exhibitons,
congresses or conferences, training programs and further education to employees,
housing facilities, employees’ children schooling facilities, high school or university
scholarships to employees’ children or the priority to hire employees’ relatives might
be some good examples of such investments. Thus, influencing As’ identity with such
investments, P leads them to share the organization’s goals and also to be involved
with organization. Then, if P chooses to invest s0 = S he will switch As’ identity to
a higher level and agents will experience less disutility from effort. But if he decides
not to invest, s0 = 0, then agents will switch to lower identity, they will be lead to
conflict and in such situation they will experience high disutility from exerting effort
at workplace.
To make this more understandable think in the following opposed situations: in
the firm X workers are treated kindly by management, supported in their needs
not only at work but also at home and in general. Also they are supported in their
personal, professional, intellectual, or human development, and encouraged to be par-
ticipative, responsible, collaborative and proactive in leading organization to achieve
their goals. In the firm Y workers are monitored, controlled at their workplace, left
out of every decision process whithin the firm, uninformed of organization’s goals and
pushed to achieve the desired performance only with the use of monetary bonuses or
punishments. Then it will be normal to expect that in the firm X, all its members
work harder, more efficiently, more motivated to achieve high standards of quality in
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production, and more implicated with customers, dealers and suppliers than in the
firm Y , independently of they are remunerated with the same, even less, amount of
money.
Solving Principal’s Problem
In the game A and P have to renegotiate contracts period after period. This as-
sumption turns the game into a dynamic re-contracting game. Then the game is
able to be solved implementing the spot contract in each period. In order to make
the vector of the spot contracts as the long term optimal solution we have to assume
that the only way to agree upon a contract is playing the repeated game at every
period t = 0; 1; :::; T; ::: as a new game.
Then we can write the P ’s problem as follows,
Maxfwt(qt);s0g t 

E[Rt(qt)j0]  E[wt(qt)j0]
i
+
h
(1  t) 

E[Rt(qt)j1]  E[wt(qt)j1]
i  Ct(s0) (2.3)
Subject to:
E[ut(wt(qt)j1)]   t(e; t) > E[ut(wt(qt)j0)]   t(e; t) (ICC) (2.4)
E[ut(wt(qt)j1)]   t(e; t) > U (PC) (2.5)
ut(w) > 0 () wt(q) > 0 () h(ut(w)) > 0 (LLC) (2.6)
(2.3) is the objective function for the principal. P does not know each agent identity.
He only knows agents’ identity distribution. Using this information, he offers a
contract that satisfies the incentive compatibility of agents with average level of
identity Et[tjs0] = avgt . Then, only agents with identity above the average level
will exert high effort and the rest shirk. (2.3) is weighted by Pt(t < avgjs0) = t
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and Pt(t > avgjs0) = (1  t) to capture this feature of the game. The first is the
probability that the identity of the A is lower than the average level, and the second
is the probability that the agent identity is higher or equal to the average level, both
conditional to P ’s decision s0 = f0; Sg.
(2.4) is A’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), and ensures that the agent
will prefer to exert high effort. (2.5) is the A’s participation constraint (PC), and
ensures that the agent will prefer to participate and accept the contract. Finally,
(2.6) is a limited liability constraint (LLC), and ensures that the low payment never
falls below zero level.
P ’s problem is solved for each t. The solution for each period t consist in a
payment function w(q) : q  ! w
w(q) =

w if q = q
w if q = q
where w > w.6 In the next section we will analyze the conditions under which
to offer socialization incentives and invest in changing As’ identity is optimal for
P . From now on advance we just show the pair of payments which solves the spot
contracting problem. Let h : u  ! w be the inverse function of the utility function,
h(u) =

w if u = u
w if u = u
Applying the variable change w = h(u(w(q))) = (u(w(q))) 1 we have the following
payments,
wt = h(ut(w)) =

U +
(1  0)

 t(e; t(s0))
 1
(2.7)
wt = h(ut(w)) =

U   0

 t(e; t(s0))
 1
: (2.8)
6 The calculation of these contingent payments is formally shown in the mathematical appendix,
section A.2
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As it can be seen, identity lowers w and raises w. To establish a more precise a rela-
tion between identity and incentive payments it is necessary to analyze how identity
and the disutility from effort interacts each with the other. Also it is necessary to
analyze how socialization affects workers’ identity and how these changes affects fu-
ture stochastic contingent payments. Once these interactions are established we can
calculate the principal’s expected costs and profits and then analyze the possible
outcomes of the game.
P can not perfectly discriminate agents attending their identity. P only knows
the distribution of identity. Then, he updates such distribution at every period taking
into account his own past behavior and knowing how the socialization process works.
After updating As’ identity distribution, P is able to offer a new contract based on
the expected identity of agents7. Thus, at every period of the game, P must offer a
new pair of expected payments adjusted to agents’ expected identity,
wt(E[tjs0]) =

U +
(1  0)

 t(e; E[tjs0])
 1
(2.9)
wt(E[tjs0]) =

U   0

 t(e; E[tjs0])
 1
: (2.10)
We write the Expected Cost Function for P at each t,
ECt = t 

0wt(E[tjs0]) + (1  0)wt(E[tjs0])

+ (1  t) 

1wt(E[tjs0]) + (1  1)wt(E[tjs0])

+ Ct(s0) (2.11)
Let us use the superscript s0 2 f0; Sg in ECs0t , in order to differentiate the
expected cost function when P invests in identity s0 = S, from the no-investment
case s0 = 0. Then we have ECSt and EC0t .
7 This solution is suboptimal compared with the first best solution where effort level and identity
are perfectly observable. Also is more far away from the first best solution than the second best
solution in which only the effort is unobservable but identity doesn’t play any role.
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EC0t = t 

0wt(E[tj0]) + (1  0)wt(E[tj0])

+ (1  t) 

1wt(E[tj0]) + (1  1)wt(E[tj0])

(2.12)
ECSt = t 

0wt(E[tjS]) + (1  0)wt(E[tjS])

+ (1  t) 

1wt(E[tjS]) + (1  1)wt(E[tjS])

+ Ct(S) (2.13)
Now we introduce into the analysis the earnings of P expressed by the function
Rt(qt). We take the earnings in expected terms due A’s identity hetereogeneity cap-
tured by the conditional distribution function Ft(tjs0), and also due to the stochastic
effort-peformance relation captured with i 2 [0; 1] probabilities. We can express the
expected earnings of P as follows,
E[Rt(qt)ji; t] = t  E[Rt(qt)j0] + (1  t)  E[Rt(qt)j1] =
h
t 

0Rt(q) + (1  0)Rt(q)
i
+
h
(1  t) 

1Rt(q) + (1  1)Rt(q)
i
We also write the Expected Revenue Function conditional to P ’s action,
ER0t =
h
t 

0Rt(q) + (1  0)Rt(q)
i
+
h
(1  t) 

1Rt(q) + (1  1)Rt(q)
i
ERSt =
h
t 

0Rt(q) + (1  0)Rt(q)
i
+
h
(1  t) 

1Rt(q) + (1  1)Rt(q)
i
Finally we write the Expected Profits Function, also conditional to P ’s choice over
s0,
E0t = ER
0
t   EC0t = t 
h
0
 
Rt(q)  wt(E[tj0])

+ (1  0)
 
Rt(q)  wt(E[tj0])
i
+ (1  t) 
h
1
 
Rt(q)  wt(E[tj0])

+ (1  1)
 
Rt(q)  wt(E[tj0])
i
(2.14)
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ESt = ER
S
t  ECSt = t
h
0
 
Rt(q) wt(E[tjS])

+(1 0)
 
Rt(q) wt(E[tjS])
i Ct(s0)
+(1 t) 
h
1
 
Rt(q) wt(E[tjS])

+(1 1)
 
Rt(q) wt(E[tjS])
i
+Ct(S) (2.15)
Identity can be considered another productive asset of the organization that we
call Motivational Capital. Confronting P ’s expected profits from using socialization
incentives St , with his expected profits from using monetary incentives 0t , in every
period t = 0; 1; 2; : : : , we can measure the return of investing in motivational capital.
This return is calculated as the present value of the stream of the differences in
expected profits obtained by the principal. Formally,
CNV mk =
TX
t=0
t

ESt   E0t

(2.16)
Where, t =
 
1
1+r
t is the discount factor, and r is the discount rate. We say that the
principal has incentives to invest in motivational capital when CNV mk > 0 and we
say that, there is no incentive to invest in motivational capital when CNV mk < 0.
2.3 Results
To obtain results first we calculate the spot contract’s cost, the organization profits
and agents utilities for every t = 0; 1; :::; T; :::. Then we confront the case in which
P chooses to use socialization incentives to change As’ identity s0 = S with the case
in which P chooses to use only monetary incentives s0 = 0. Finally we present some
results drawn from comparative statics in the last subsection. We also discuss on
some conclusions.
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2.3.1 Identity Incentives and Socialization: Investment in Mo-
tivational Capital
Consider the case in which the principal chooses to use identity incentives s0 = S.
In this case the principal tries to benefit from investing in motivational capital. The
spot payments at every t are,
wSt (Et[tjS]) = h

U +
(1  0)

 t(e; Et[tjS])

(2.17)
wSt (Et[tjS]) = h

U   0

 t(e; Et[tjS])

(2.18)
At t = 0 payments will be,
wt(E0[0]) = h

U +
(1  0)

 0(e; E0[0])

(2.19)
wt(E0[0]) = h

U   0

 0(e; E0[0])

(2.20)
Payments at t = 0 are equal independently of using socialization incentives s0 = S
or pure monetary incentives s0 = 0. This is so because at the starting period of the
game the socialization effect can not have occurred yet. For the case of s0 = S we
will write the spot expected profit function for the principal as follows,
ESt = ER
S
t  ECSt = t 
h
0
 
Rt(q) wt(E[tjS])

+ (1  0)
 
Rt(q) wt(E[tjS])
i
+(1 t) 
h
1
 
Rt(q) wt(E[tjS])

+(1 1)
 
Rt(q) wt(E[tjS])
i Ct(S) (2.21)
Now we calculate either, the spot expected utility USt for an Ah who have an identity
ht > 
avg
t and chooses et = e and also the spot expected utility for an Al who have
an identity lt 6 avgt and chooses et = e.
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US;ht = 1

U + (1 0)

 t
 
e; Et[tjS]

+ (1  1)

U   0

 t
 
e; Et[tjS]
   t e; ht (S) and, (2.22)
US;lt = 0

U + (1 0)

 t
 
e; Et[tjS]

+ (1  0)

U   0

 t
 
e; Et[tjS]
   t e; lt(S) (2.23)
Finally, we compute the present value of the sum of spot profits and the sum of the
spot utilities, and also the expression which measures the present value of the total
surplus TSS when P action is s0 = S.
 S =
TX
t=0
tSt =
TX
t=0
t
h
ERSt   ECSt
i
(2.24)
S =
TX
t=0
t
h
t  US;lt + (1  t)  US;ht

(2.25)
TSS = [St +  
S] (2.26)
2.3.2 Agents in Conflict: No-investment in Motivational Cap-
ital
In this section we analyze the no investment case or s0 = 0. In this case P does not
invest any amount of resources to promote A’s identity. The mere use of monetary
incentives to control As’ behavior will put agents into conflict toward organization.
For this case spot payments are,
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w0t (Et[tj0]) = h

U +
(1  0)

 t(e; Et[tj0])

(2.27)
w0t (Et[tj0]) = h

U   0

 t(e; Et[tj0])

(2.28)
Payments in t = 0 are exactly the same as those described in the previous subsec-
tion. taking the expected costs, EC0t into account we can calculate the spot expected
profit 0t for P .
E0t = ER
0
t   EC0t = t 
h
0
 
Rt(q)  wt(E[tj0])

+ (1  0)
 
Rt(q)  wt(E[tj0])
i
+ (1  t) 
h
1
 
Rt(q)  wt(E[tj0])

+ (1  1)
 
Rt(q)  wt(E[tj0])
i
(2.29)
Then we also can calculate the spot expected utility U0t for an Ah agent who have
an identity ht > 
avg
t and chooses et = e, and for an agent Al who have an identity
lt 6 avgt and chooses et = e.
U0;ht = 1

U + (1 0)

 t(e; Et[tj0])

+ (1  1)

U   0

 t(e; Et[tj0])

   t(e; t(0)) and, (2.30)
U0;lt = 0

U + (1 0)

 t
 
e; Et[tj0]

+ (1  0)

U   0

 t
 
e; Et[tj0]
   t e; lt(0) (2.31)
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Also for this case we complete the results showing the present value of the sum of
spot profits and the sum of the spot utilities, and also the expresion which measures
the present value of the social welfare TS0 under the incentive policy s0 = 0.
 0 =
TX
t=0
tEt
0
t =
TX
t=0
t
 
ER0t   EC0t

(2.32)
0 =
TX
t=0
t
h
t  U0;lt + (1  t)
  U0;ht  (2.33)
TS0 =

0t +  
0
t

(2.34)
2.3.3 Comparative statics
Our model shows that an agent with identity whithin the firm or public organization
is willing to work hard at a high effort for a lower overall pay. This lower incentive
requirement to foster high effort from agents represents a cost advantage of achieving
high performance to the organization. When this cost advantage is high enough, it
can be worthwhile for P to undertake a costly program to promote agents’ identity.
Comparative statics of our model establish under which conditions agents’ iden-
tity lead the organization to find profitable to invest in promoting identity among
workers. If inculcating identity is low-cost, if output and agents’ effort are weakly
correlated (effort is hard to observe an hard to reward), if agents are especially risk
averse or if high effort is critical to the organization’s output, then the use of an
identity incentive scheme will be more profitable and more likely to be used.
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Identity and Motivational Capital
One very first result that it is straightforward to set, comes from the comparison
between the current value of the sum of spot profits for P when he takes S action
and when he takes 0 action. That is, firstly calculating the Current Net Value of the
A’s motivational capital (CNV mk), and then checking if it is positive or negative.This
first result is formally shown in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let T the number of periods of the game. Let K < T be number of
periods large enough to allow socialization or conflict entirely happen. For a  large
enough and if 1w0K + (1  1)w0K > S + h(U) there exists a threshold t such that,
CNV mk =  S    0 = 0 (2.35)
from which the following is concluded:
i. If t 6 T then CNV mk > 0 and P finds profitable to invest in motivational
capital and choose the s0 = S strategy.
ii. If t > T then CNV mk < 0 and P finds profitable not to invest in motivational
capital and choose the s0 = 0 strategy.
Figure 2 illustrate results of proposition 1. Figure 2.2 shows jointly as a function
of time t, P ’s Es0t , ERs0t and ECs0t in either case, when P choose s0 = 0 ors0 = S. A
comparison between ESt and E0t and the discounted sum of the difference between
these two functions CNV mkt are shown.
The graph (d) down, on the right side of the figure 2.2 shows the value of the
CNV mk as a function of time t. Two cases are shown in the graph: socialization
incentives s0 = S and pure monetary incentives s0 = 0. The t threshold determines
the critical point that states the optimal strategy for P .
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Figure 2.2: In the figure, first graph (a) shows the time evolution of ER0t , EC0t and E0t in
the case of pure monetary incentives s0 = 0. T 0 represents the period in which the socialization
process is completed and all the agents present an identity TS = . Second graph (b) shows the
time evolution of ERSt , ECSt and ESt in the case of identity incentives s0 = S. TS represents the
period in which the conflict process is completed and all the agents present an identity T 0 = .
Third graph (c) confront the time evolution of P’s expected profits in each case, s0 = 0, and s0 = S.
Finally, d) shows the time evolution of the current net value of the motivational capital CNV mkt ,
where the profitability threshold labelled with t, is the cutoff between CNV mkt function and x-axis.
The motivational capital profitability threshold t is key for P in order to choose
the optimal action. This threshold depends on several variables. The relations given
between these variables and the motivational capital profitability threshold is what
determines P ’s optimal decision in this contracting game. We will focus on the
analysis of these relations in order to draw conditions under which one or another
strategy, s0 2 f0; Sg is optimal.
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Now let us compare the total surplus of each strategy s0 2 f0; Sg of P , to analyze
the cases in which all the members whithin an organisation are better off. The
following proposition shows that the social optimum coincides with the optimal choice
of P . This is so, because incentive compatibility constraint (2.4) and participation
constraint (2.5) ensure that for every choice s0 2 f0; Sg of P , and every t = 0; 1; : : : ; T
the expected utility required by A to exert high effort is the same. The only difference
consists in the source from which A gets the utility. Depending on the P ’s choice over
s0 2 0; S, A get utility from the economic incentive and identity with different weights
although the total expected utility remains constant. Proposition 2 establishes, when
a given strategy profile is socially optimun.
Proposition 2. Let CNV mk = TSS TS0 = PTt=0 t EC0t   ECSt . Let s0; et l;ht 
be the strategy profile that solves the game.
i. If CNV mk > 0, then (S; eh; el) is a Pareto-Efficient strategy profile and Pareto-
Dominates any other possible strategy profile: (S; eh; el), (0; eh; el) or (0; eh; el).
ii. If CNV mk < 0, then (0; eh; el) is a Pareto Efficient strategy profile and Pareto
Dominates any other possible strategy profile: (S; eh; el), (S; eh; el) or (0; eh; el).
Proposition 2 then shows that in case of CNV mk > 0 investing in motivational
capital results optimal for the principal. High effort will be optimal for the agent
whose identity is higher than average eh. The agent whose identity is low will shirk
el.Then, (S; eh; el) is the equilibrium strategy profile for the game and there is no
chances to improve any of the players without necessarily worsening at least one
of the others. Analogously, if CNV mk < 0, then using pure monetary rewards is
optimal for the principal. High effort choice will be optimal for the agent whose
identity is high eh. The agent whose identity is low will shirk el. Then, (0; e) is the
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equilibrium strategy profile for the game, there is no chances to improve any player
of the game without necessarily worsening at least one of the others.
The Role of the Depreciation Rate of Motivational Investment.
Profitability threshold t and time depreciation of the motivational investment that
the principal must face to run a socialization incentives program , provide another
interesting insight. Once the entire socialization effect or conflict effect has happened,
principal finds crucial to balance two opposite effects: the higher profits from having
agents with high identity in contrast with the additional costs he must face to run a
socialization incentive policy. The first effect establish that 1(R w0t )+(1 1)(R 
w0t ) < 1(R  wSt ) + (1  1)(R  wSt ).
But, to lead agents’ identity towards t = , P must face the consequent de-
preciation cost of using socialization incentives Ct(S) = S, in t = 1; 2; : : : . Then
depreciation cost rate  becomes a key parameter to study the profitability of invest-
ing in motivational capital. As  takes values closer to one, t becomes larger and is
less likely for the principal to find profitable to invest in motivational capital.
In other words, in a context in which a principal P , who have to reinvest a
sufficiently high amount of resources Ct(S) = S in t = 1; 2; : : : , would not find
that investment profitable because it would never be compensated by the savings
generated from lower incentive requirements. To illustrate this case, assume that
there is a maximum depreciation rate + above of which the Current Net Value of
motivational capital never will reach a positive value. Then, investing in motivational
capital will not be profitable at all. Proposition 3 summarize this result.
Proposition 3. Let K < T be number of periods large enough to allow socialization
or conflict entirely happens.Where K =  if s0 = S and K =  if s0 = 0. Taking
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S as constant, if  > 1w
0
K+(1 1)w0K h(U)
S
, then CNV mk < 0 for all t = 1; 2; ::: and P
never will find profitable to invest in motivational capital.
Figure 2.3: Negative Current Net Value of the Motivational Capital, CNV mk < 0 due
to high cost of depreciation S.
Intuitively proposition 3 states that, there is no reason to spend resources to
change workers’ identity, neither in the short run nor in the long run, whenever
As’ identity is not large enough to cause an advantage in payments which offset
the cost of promoting identity
 
E[w0t   wSt ji; t] < Ct(S)

. This case have sense for
organizations and jobs in which workers have to perform in bad work environment,
doing nasty, exhausting and/or boring tasks, the work implicitly involves conflict of
interests between the members of organization and is costly to change their identity.
However, we are more interested in the case in which identity is large enough to
overcome the cost of generating it E[w0t   wSt ji; t] > S at some time period t0 2
f0; 1; : : : g. In this case P ’s expected savings from identity when is strictly increasing
and bounded. Taken together with the assumption of a constant depreciation cost,
S we have that the optimality of investing in motivational capital becomes a matter
of time. The time that the organization has to wait in order to get profits from
identity changes, CNV mk > 0, will be a function of the depreciation rate value .
Proposition 4 shows such a relation.
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Proposition 4. Let j = fA;Bg be two alternative actuations to foster agents’ iden-
tity with A and B associated depreciation costs such that A < B. Let t = t0j,
t0j 2 f0; 1; : : : g be the time periods in which the change in agents’ identity reach a
value such that E
h
w0t0j
  wSt0j ji; t
i
> jS. Let t = tj , tj 2 f0; 1; : : : g be the number
of time periods in which CNV mkj = 0. Then t0A < t0B and tA < tB.
Figure 2.4: Current Net Value of Motivational Capital with two different depreciation
rates A and B such that A < B.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the result of the proposition 4. In situations in which in-
vesting in motivational capital is profitable. Then, those actuations or investments
with higher depreciation costs will require a higher number of periods in order to
generate positive returns. In other words, when changing agents’ identity requires
more resources (obstinate agents, distrustful agents,. . . ), investing in motivational
capital will be less likely to be optimal. Organizations with high rotation rate of
employees is a particular case of this result.
Effort Effectiveness and Motivational Capital
The parameter i 2 [0; 1] measures A’s effort effectiveness, where i = 0; 1 serve to
distinguish low effort action and high effort action respectively. i measures the prob-
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ability of achieving high performance conditional on A’s effort choice. We say that
i is informative if 1 > 0. As mean as the value of 0 approaches to 1, P must offer
higher incentives to force A to exert high effort. This is what literature in economics
of information calls agent’s rent extraction power. In words, to make shirking costly
enough in order to incentivize A to high effort will result more expensive as mean as
performance is more noisy signal of effort.
Then pure monetary incentives results too expensive when the signal used to link
payments to effort is hard to observe and hard to reward. In such cases, P will find
optimal to invest in motivational capital s0 = S more likely. Although investing in
motivational capital is costly Ct(S), P will reduce payment costs because workers
with identity do not need monetary incentives to exert high effort (at least not as high
as those of the workers without identity). If 0 implies higher monetary incentives,
then potential savings from implementing s0 = S strategy will be very high and the
current net value, CNV mk becomes positive earlier.
Proposition 5. Higher values of 0 implies higher values of CNV mkt for every t =
0; 1; : : : ; T; : : : . Then, investing in motivational capital is more profitable for P, when
performance is a more random signal about A’s effort level.
Proposition 5 shows that as higher is the probability of achieving high perfor-
mance when the effort is low, p(q = qje = e) = 0, then more profitable will be for
P to invest in motivational capital s0 = S8.
Figure 2.5 shows how the high payment grow towards infinity and the low pay-
ment falls up to 0 (LLC) as 0 approaches to 1. However, having agents with identity
implies that no incentive payments are needed to elicit them to exert high effort and
8 This result is consistent with what Akerlof and Kranton (2005) state about identity as motivating
for work. [. . . ] a change in identity is the ideal motivator if, [. . . ] the effort of a worker is either
hard to observe or hard to reward.(p. 10)
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Figure 2.5: Information and motivational capital. As figure shows, values of 0 closer to
1 makes motivational investments more profitable for P. A worse signal of effort increases
A’s rent extraction power so much that the expected savings from having workers with
identity exceed the costs of investing in otivatonal capital. With t =  the low payment
h(ut; ) goes to 0 (LLC) when 0 approaches 1 and the high payment h(ut; ) goes to
infinity. However, if t =  the payment remains constat independently of the value
of 0.
then, the savings from having workers with identity will be so large that compensate
the cost of socialization investments.
Agents’ Risk Aversion and Motivational Capital
In the model, agents are risk-averse with respect to their monetary earnings. They
perceive utility from incentives which consists in contingent payments wt(qt). But
agents also experience utility from identity. As mean as agent’s identity increases,
fewer incentives are required in order to encourage him to exert high effort. Less
variation in payments indicates that A must be compensated with a lower risk pre-
mium. Then, as As’ identity increases, incentives fall and this constitutes another
cost-saving source for the organization.
38
Proposition 6 formally states that investing in motivational capital is more prof-
itable in the presence of risk-averse A.
Proposition 6. Let A1 and A2 be a pair of agents with 1 and 2 identity respec-
tively. If agents are risk-averse and 1 < 2, then incentives will be lower in the case
of A2 than in the case of A1. Therefore t1 > t2 and P will find more profitable to
invest in motivational capital when agents are more risk averse.
The intuition behind this result is that incentives must be greater in order to
encourage high effort from agents without identity. Lower identity enlarge the dif-
ferent between low w and high w incentive payments. Given that A is risk averse,
the risk premium that P should offer to reach the certainty equivalent will result
higher. Analogously, agents with identity will require fewer incentives to exert high
effort. Consequently, an agent with high identity has to bear a lower variance over
payments and has to be compensated with a lower risk premium. Thus identity
generates savings for P .
2.4 Conclusion
We introduce the notion of identity in a model of principal agent with moral hazard.
Also we incorporate the principal’s ability to change agents’ identity. We conclude the
conditions under which spending resources in changing agents’ identity is profitable
for organizations. These conditions are the length of the contracts offered, the total
cost of investing in changing agents’ identity for the principal, the informative value
of the signal used to observe and incentivize effort, and the degree of agents’ risk
aversion.
An initial investment in motivational capital using non-monetary incentives though
costly at inception, will result more effective to control public organizations expen-
diture. Then, Governments, political advisors and public organizations should take
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this into account and incorporate these findings to the policy design. For instance,
from the proposition 1 a planner could conclude that monetary incentives are the
best way to achieve a specifical goal in the short term. However for the long term
goal proposition 1 establishes, that an investment in motivational capital to foster
agents’ identity is the most profitable action for the organization.
Finally, wherever the principal in the public organization is politically designated,
their time horizon will be the legislative time period and then it is more likely that
they are focused in the short term goals. Thus, they will have a willingness to choose
pure monetary rewards as incentive schemes, despite in the long term the best choice
is the investment in motivational capital given that workers’ contracts are much
longer that legislative piece of time. Anyway these conclusions are interesting future
research questions which, should be tested and studied in depth in the future.
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Chapter 3
Motivational Capital and Incentives
in Health Care Organizations
3.1 Introduction
The present chapter investigates the principal-agent relationship between managers
and doctors as in McGuire (2000), where the divergence in objectives between the
principal’s performance measures and the physicians’ mission is a source of conflict.
It is assumed that principals in health care are primarily focused on health ben-
efits. They focus heavily upon improving certain health performance measures that
are easily observable by the electorate: for instance reducing the amount of time
spent on waiting lists, increasing the number of operations conducted for common
pathologies, increasing the infrastructure, buying new technology assets, reducing
costs and saving resources, and enlarging the range of services supplied. In contrast,
physicians’ goals are focused toward patients, a subset of all tax-payers, and also
have other interests in clinical and medical research, teaching and further education
that, taken together, form what is called the doctors’ “mission”.
One key fact of the approach proposed in this chapter is that incentives may make
the action of providing health a less convincing signal of doctors’ intrinsic motivation,
resulting in observers interpreting some generous acts as merely self-interested. This
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may crowd out doctors intrinsic motivation and they could shift from an ethical to
a payoff maximizing frame, as shown Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Bowles and
Polanía-Reyes (2012).
The contribution of the present approach is threefold: first, following Dewatripont
et al. (1999a) research program, we present a dynamical principal-agent model with
intrinsically motivated agents and repeated effort and incentives choices to analyze
the evolution of optimal contracts; second, crowding effects are incorporated into this
dynamic model; and third, the proposed dynamical setting allows us to endogenize
changes in doctors’ preferences in response to the principal actions and therefore to
evaluate how optimal contracts evolve and affect the outcomes of the game.
In the model, health managers have two options to motivate doctors: motivational
investments and monetary incentives. We use the term motivational investments to
refer to the resources devoted to well designed mechanisms, beyond the monetary
incentives, oriented towards maintaining, recovering or enhancing doctors’ intrinsic
motivation through a crowding-in effect. However, the use of pure monetary incen-
tives may discourage doctors through a crowding-out effect, leading them to behave
as payoff maximizers.
We discuss the conditions under which spending resources on motivational capital
is optimal for the health organization’s manager. Our results show that in the long
run, investing in motivational capital will be more efficient than using monetary
incentives. We will also prove that when doctors are risk-averse, it is more profitable
for the health manager to invest in motivational capital.
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3.2 The Model
There are two players in the game: a doctor A (agent) and a health manager P
(principal)1. We assume that A is intrinsically motivated. We also restrict the
analysis to linear contracts.
The game is played for a finite number of periods t = 0; 1; :::; T; :::. There
is a health performance measure qt 2 R that P wants to maximize. Define qt
as the amount of services produced by the health organization in the period t =
0; 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : as in Siciliani (2009) or the number of QALYs2.For all t let Rt(qt)
be a function Rt : R  ! R+ which assigns a monetary value to every qt.
Performance qt is a function of doctor’s effort et 2 fe; eg. Assume that qt 2 fq; qg
in which q > q. Take q as P ’s target for performance level and q as a failure to reach
this target performance level. Let p(qt = qjet) = i be the conditional probability
of high performance given A’s effort choice i = 0; 1 in which 0 indicates low effort e
and 1 indicates high effort e. The probability distribution of qt conditioned to et is
given by: p(qt = qjet = e) = 1; p(qt = qjet = e) = 1  1 and, p(qt = qjet = e) = 0;
p(qt = qjet = e) = 1   0. We assume that 1 > 0, which indicates that qt is an
informative signal of et.
We denote the health expected revenue conditional to qt with E[Rt(qt)ji]; R and
R will stand for Rt(q) and Rt(q), respectively.
Let wt = w(qt) be the contingent monetary reward offered by P : w(qt) = wt and
w(q
t
) = wt, where wt > wt. E[w(qt)ji] will then be the expected monetary cost
for the health organization, or P . Let s0 2 f0; Sg be the total initial investment in
motivational capital. This investment generates a cost stream Ct(s0) that takes the
1 We use she and he to refer to the agent and the principal respectively, is conventional whithin
the principal agent literature.
2 QALY stands for Quality Adjusted Live Years. For an estimation of the monetary value of a
QALY see ?.
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value C0(S) = S or C0(0) = 0 in t = 0 and gives the depreciation cost Ct(S) = S for
every t > 1 at a constant depreciation rate of  2 [0; 1). We assume, as in Murdock
(2002), that by having motivated doctors, P should expect discounted future profits
higher than the current cost of motivational incentives. P ’s problem is to maximise
the expected profit function.
E[tji] = E[Rt(qt)ji]  E[wt(qt)ji]  Ct(s0)
We represent A’s preferences with the following overall expected utility function.
E[Utji] = E[ut(wt)ji]   t(et) + t
 
wt; s0

The first term on the right hand side of the above expression ut(wt), represents
A’s utility from monetary incentives which “...complement the remuneration provided
by the employer of the physician (p. 1)” , as in de Pouvourville (2012). We assume
that A is risk-averse and that this utility function from monetary rewards satisfies
the Inada conditions3.
The middle term  t(et) is the cost from effort in utility terms that depends
positively upon effort:  t(e) = 0 and  t(e) = 	. Thus,  t(et) 2 f0;	g where
 t(e) = f	 2 Rj	 > 1g.
The last term is t(wt; s0) 2 [0;], in which t : R2+  ! R+ captures A’s intrinsic
motivation. Intrinsic motivation depends negatively on incentives wt. This captures
the crowding-out effect of incentives. Intrinsic motivation depends positively on P ’s
investment in motivational capital s0.
The incentives offered by P may affect the intrinsic motivation of A through
crowding effects. The properties of this intrinsic motivation function and of crowding
3 Inada conditions: dut(wt)=dwt > 0, d2ut(wt)=dw2t < 0, ut(0) = 0, lim
t!1
h
dut(wt)=dwt
i
= 0 and
lim
t!0
h
dut(wt)=dwt
i
=1.
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effects are summed up in the following assumptions:
A1: For any fixed value of wt(qt) = ~wt such that ~wt 2 [0;1)  [0;1) we have
t( ~wt; S)  t( ~wt; 0) > 0.
A2: Intrinsic motivation depends negatively upon incentives:
@t(wt; s0)=@wt < 0.
A3: Crowding in: in the case that P chooses s0 = S, t increases over time:
dt (wt; S) =dt > 0
A4: Crowding out: in case of P chooses s0 = 0, t decreases over time;
dt (wt; 0) =dt < 0
Assumption A1 shows a fixed crowding effect. Assumption A2 states that in
presence of intrinsic motivation, agents enjoy a higher reward from it if they perform
at high effort norm. Assumption A3 tells that intrinsic motivation is negatively
correlated with incentives (crowding out). Assumption A4 captures a crowding-in
effect: when P chooses the s0 = S, A’s intrinsic motivation will increase period after
period. Assumption A5 captures a crowding-out effect: when P chooses a s0 = 0,
A’s intrinsic motivation will diminish period after period.
Physicians may have different degrees of intrinsic motivation at t = 0. The
model captures this heterogeneity with a probability distribution function, F0(0)
that is defined over the value of the intrinsic motivation at t = 0. For any  2
[0;] the distribution function calculates the probability F0() = Prob(0 6 ).
In the game, P knows F0(0). His offer at t = 0 affects A’s intrinsic motivation
through crowding effects. We model crowding effects as time displacements of the
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distribution function conditional to s0 2 f0; Sg and wt (for example, Ft(tjwt; s0)).
Thus, for any t =  2 [0;], the conditional distribution calculates the probability
Ft(tjwt; s0) = Prob(t 6 ).
Figure 3.1 shows how crowding effects affect the intrinsic motivation probability
distribution function. At t = 0, P knows a given distribution function F0(0).
His choice of incentives in t = 0 affects agents intrinsic motivation switching the
distribution function at t = 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : .
Figure 3.1: Stochastic Dominance. The figure shows how crowd-
ing effects affect the intrinsic motivation probability distribution func-
tion in response to principal’s choice of incentive policy: motivational
investments s0 = S, or pure monetary incentives s0 = 0. Motivational
investments s0 = S cause crowding-in switching the distribution function
to the right period after period. Pure monetary incentives s0 = 0 cause
crowding-out switching the distribution function to the left period after
period. Stochastic dominance ensures that no curve cross each together
As shown in the figure, if P chooses s0 = 0, then the distribution function will
shift to the left period after period. In other words, if incentives are only monetary,
then doctors will concentrate around lower values of intrinsic motivation t = 0. In
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contrast, if incentives are motivational s0 = S, then doctors will concentrate around
higher values of intrinsic motivation t = . In this latter case, the distribution
function shifts period after period to the right in figure 1.
We assume stochastic dominance in distribution function time shifts. This prop-
erty involves, as shown in figure 1, that P ’s choices of incentives affect every A
intrinsic motivation in the same way. As a result, stochastic dominance assumes
that probability distributions do not intersect on another4.
The game is a repeated dynamic re-contracting game. In each period of the game
both players have to make new choices: P must offer a new contract after updating
his beliefs about A, and A has to choose a new effort level. The choices made by
P affect A’s intrinsic motivation, and changes in A’s motivation affect the contract
and equilibrium payments offered by P in the next period.
Each period of the game consists of three stages: stage 0, stage 1, and stage 2.
The timing of the within-period in each t = 0; 1 : : : ; T; : : : is:
(0) The principal P knows the distribution of doctors’ intrinsic motivation F0(0)
at t = 0 or updates Ft(tjs0; wt) given wt and s0 at t = 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : . He then offers
a contract to A. This contract consists of a pair of stochastic contingent payments
w0(q0) = fw;wg and the choice to invest or not invest in motivational capital s0:
fw(q0); s0g at t = 0 and fw(qt); s0g at t = 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : .
(1) A accepts or refuses the contract. If she accepts, then she chooses an action
et 2 fe; eg at each t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : . If she refuses then she gets her reservation
utility U .
(2) Finally, output is realised qt 2 fqt; qtg, payment is realised w(qt) = fwt; wtg
and payoffs t and Ut are realized in each t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : .
Figure 3.2 shows the sequence of these stages in t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : .
4 For a more formal description of this property, see the mathematical appendix.
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Figure 3.2: Timing. The figure describes the stages of the game within each
period, differentiating the starting period of the game t = 0, where no crowding
effect has had place, from subsequent periods t = 1; 2; : : : where P ’s actions affects
As’ intrinsic motivation through crowding effects
Before solving the game, let us assume that P and A can not sign long term
contracts at t = 0. As a result, they have to agree upon the rewards at every period
t. Once P has chosen s0 = S in t = 0 he bears the depreciation cost Ct(s0) = S.
We also assume that there is no contract renegotiation in the short term. In this
game, the only way to agree upon a contract is to play the repeated game at every
period t = 0; 1; : : : ; T; : : : as a new game.
We can therefore write P ’s problem as follows,
Maxfwt(qt);s0gt

E[Rt(qt)j0]  E[wt(qt)j0]

+ (1  t)

E[Rt(qt)j1]  E[wt(qt)j1]

  Ct(s0) (3.1)
Subject to
E[ut(wt)j1)]   t(e) + e  t

wt; s0

>
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E[ut(wt)j0)]   t(e) + e  t

wt; s0

(ICC) (3.2)
E[ut(wt)j1)]   t(e) + e  t

wt; s0

> U (PC) (3.3)
ut(w) > 0 (LLC) (3.4)
Where Pt(t < js0) = t is the probability of having a doctor with an intrinsic
motivation lower than the average conditional to P ’s choice of s0, and Pt(t > js0) =
1   t is the probability of having a doctor with an intrinsic motivation higher or
equal than the average conditional to P ’s choice of s0. The objective function of P
is weighted by t and 1   t because P does not know the intrinsic motivation of
each A. Therefore, he will offer a contract sufficient to incentivize the agent with
average level of intrinsic motivation. Thus, those agents who are less intrinsically
motivated than the average t < t will shirk, and those who are equal or more
intrinsically motivated than the average t > t will exert high effort5. Condition
(3.2) is A’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) and ensures that the agent will
prefer to exert high effort. (3.3) is the A’s participation constraint (PC) and ensures
that the agent will prefer to participate and accept the contract. Finally, (3.4) is a
limited liability constraint (LLC) and ensures that the low utility payment will never
fall below zero.
The solution to the above problem for each t is a pair of contingent payments
fw;wg associated with q and q, respectively. Let us show how we calculate the
equilibrium of the game.
For notational simplicity we will write ut(w) = u and ut(w) = u. Let h : u(w) 7 !
w be the inverse of the utility function h(u(w)) = (u(w)) 1 = w; then w = h(u) and
w = h(u). Finally  = (1   0); and reservation utility is denoted by U .
5 When crowding-out (crowding-in) effect entirely happens, all agents’ intrinsic motivation will
reach t = 0 (t = ).Then, all agents will exert high effort because t = t = 0 (t = t = ). As a
consequence P’s benefit function will be Et = 1[Rt(qt) wt(qt)] (1 1)[Rt(qt) wt(qt)] Ct(s0).
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We rewrite P ’s problem as follows:
Maxfwt(qt);s0g t 

0
 
R  h(u)  (1  0) (R  h(u))
+ (1  t) 

1
 
R  h(u)  (1  1) (R  h(u))  Ct(s0) (3.5)
Subject to
1u+ (1  1)u 	 + t > 0u+ (1  0)u+ t (ICC) (3.6)
1u+ (1  1)u 	 + t > U (PC) (3.7)
u > 0 (LLC) (3.8)
Letting  and  be the non-negative Khun-Tucker multipliers associated respec-
tively to (ICC) and (PC) constraints. First-order conditions of this problem lead
to:
 
1=u0(w)

= +    =1 (3.9) 
1=u0(w)

=      =(1  1) (3.10)
The equations (3.9) and (3.10) (jointly with (3.6) and (3.7)) form a system of
four equations with four variables (w;w; ; ). Multiplying (3.9) by 1 and (3.10) by
(1  1) and adding those two modified equations, we obtain;
 =

1=u
0(w)

+

1  1)=u0(w)

> 0 (3.11)
Therefore,  > 0 and the participation constraint (3.9) is binding. Using (3.11)
and (3.9), we also obtain,
 =

(1  1)  1=


 
1=u0(w)
   1=u0(w) > 0 (3.12)
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Therefore,  > 0 and the incentive compatibility constraint (3.6) is also binding.
Thus, we can immediately obtain the values of u and u by solving a system with two
equations and two unknowns. The result is shown below:
ut = U   t (wt; s0) +

(1  0)=

	
ut = U   t (wt; s0) 

0=

	:
Applying the variable change wt(qt) = h(ut(wt)) = (ut(wt))
 1, we have the fol-
lowing payments,
wt = h(ut) =

U   t (wt; s0) +

(1  0)=

	
 1
wt = h(ut) =

U   t (wt; s0) 

0=

	
 1
:
Thus, at every period of the game, P must offer to A the following expected
payments,
wt =

U   E[tjwt; s0] +

(1  0)=

	
 1
(3.13)
wt =

U   E[tjwt; s0] 

0=

	
 1
: (3.14)
Using (3.13) and (3.14) P ’s Expected Cost function ECs0t , Expected Revenue
function ERs0t and Expected Profit function E
s0
t are calculated for every t as follows,
ECt = t 

0wt + (1  0)wt

+ (1  t)

1wt + (1  1)wt

+ Ct(s0) (3.15)
ERt = t 

0Rt + (1  0) Rt

+ (1  t)

1Rt + (1  1)Rt

+ Ct(s0) (3.16)
Et = ERt   ECt (3.17)
Let us use the superscript s0 2 f0; Sg in ECs0t and ws0t to differentiate the ex-
pected cost function and expected payments when P invests in motivational capital
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s0 = S from the no investment case s0 = 0. We then write conditional to s0 2 f0; Sg
two Expected Cost functions, two Expected Revenue functions and two Expected
Profit functions.
EC0t = t 

0wt + (1  0)wt

+ (1  t)

1wt + (1  1)wt

(3.18)
ECSt = t 

0wt + (1  0)wt

+ (1  t)

1wt + (1  1)wt

+ Ct(S) (3.19)
ER0t = t 

0Rt + (1  0)Rt

+ (1  t) 

1Rt + (1  1)Rt

(3.20)
ERSt = t 

0Rt + (1  0)Rt

+ (1  t) 

1Rt + (1  1)Rt

+ Ct(S) (3.21)
E0t = ER
0
t   EC0t = t 

0
 
Rt   wt

+ (1  0) (Rt   wt)

+ (1  t)

1
 
Rt   wt

+ (1  1) (Rt   wt)

(3.22)
ESt = ER
S
t   ECSt = t 

0
 
Rt   wt

+ (1  0) (Rt   wt)

+ (1  t) 

1
 
Rt   wt

+ (1  1) (Rt   wt)

  Ct(S) (3.23)
As we have said in Section II, doctors’ intrinsic motivation can be considered
another productive asset or capital of the health organization called Motivational
Capital. The current net value (CNV mk) of the return of an investment in motiva-
tional capital is:
CNV mk =
TX
t=0
t

ESt   E0t

(3.24)
in which, t =
 
1=(1 + r)
t is the discount factor, and r is the discount rate.
We say that the principal has incentives to invest in motivational capital when
CNV mk > 0 and we say that, there is no incentive to invest in motivational capital
when CNV mk < 0.
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3.3 Results
We solve the principal’s problem under two alternative scenarios: when P chooses
s0 = S and when he chooses s0 = 0. We calculate the solution for each case to show
necessary and sufficient conditions for investing in motivational capital.
3.3.1 Motivational Incentives: Crowding In
First, we solve the model for the case in which the health manager chooses s0 = S.
In this case, A’s spot utilities and spot payments in each t are:
uSt = U   t (wt; S) +
 
(1  0)=

	 (3.25)
uSt = U   t (wt; S) 
 
0=

	 (3.26)
wSt =

U   Et[tjwt; S] +
 
(1  0)=

	
 1
(3.27)
wSt =

U   Et[tjwt; S] 
 
0=

	
 1
: (3.28)
Using (3.25) and (3.26) we calculate A’s expected utility Et[USt ji; t] for every
period t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; T . We differentiate two cases, Ah or when agents have an
intrinsic motivation above the average ht > t on the one hand, and Al or when
agents who have an intrinsic motivation below the average hl < t on the other
hand.
EUS;ht = Et[US;ht j1; ht ] =

1u
S
t + (1  1)uSt

 	 + hkt (wt; S) (3.29)
EUS;lt = Et[US;lt j0; lt] =

0u
S
t + (1  0)uSt

+ 
lj
t (wt; S) (3.30)
Where hit (wt; S) is the amount of intrinsic motivation of k-est agent whose in-
trinsinc motivation is above the average and ljt (wt; S) is the amount of intrinsic
motivation of j-est agent whose intrinsinc motivation is below the average.
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Finally, using (3.23), (3.29) and (3.30), we calculate the current value of the sum
of all periods expected profits ( S), the sum of the all periods expected utilities (S)
and the current value of the total surplus (TSS) when the action of P is s0 = S.
 S =
TX
t=0
tESt
S =
TX
t=0
t
h
t  EUS;lt + (1  t)  EUS;ht
i
TSS = S +  S (3.31)
3.3.2 Motivational Incentives: Crowding Out
The second case is s0 = 0, when P uses pure monetary rewards and causes the crowd-
ing out of intrinsic motivation. In this case, A’s spot utilities and spot payments in
each t are:
u0t = U   t (wt; 0) +
 
(1  0)=

	 (3.32)
u0t = U   t (wt; 0) 
 
0=

	 (3.33)
w0t =

U   Et[tjwt; 0] +
 
(1  0)=

	
 1
(3.34)
w0t =

U   Et[tjwt; 0] 
 
0=

	
 1
: (3.35)
Using (3.32) and (3.33) we calculate A’s expected utility Et[U0t ji; t] for every
period t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; T . We differentiate two cases, Ah or when agents have an
intrinsic motivation above the average ht > t on the one hand, and Al or when
agents who have an intrinsic motivation below the average hl < t on the other
hand.
EU0;ht = Et[U0;ht j1; ht ] =

1u
0
t + (1  1)u0t

 	 + hkt (wt; 0) (3.36)
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EU0;lt = Et[U0;lt j0; lt] =

0u
0
t + (1  0)u0t

+ 
lj
t (wt; 0) (3.37)
Where hkt (wt; 0) is the amount of intrinsic motivation of k-est agent whose in-
trinsinc motivation is above the average and ljt (wt; 0) is the amount of intrinsic
motivation of j-est agent whose intrinsinc motivation is below the average.
Finally, using (3.22), (3.36) and (3.37), we calculate the current value of the sum
of all periods expected profits ( S), the sum of the all periods expected utilities (0)
and the current value of the total surplus (TS0) when the action of P is s0 = 0.
 0 =
TX
t=0
tE0t
0 =
TX
t=0
t
h
t  EU0;lt + (1  t)  EU0;ht
i
TS0 = 0 +  0 (3.38)
3.3.3 Comparative Statics
A health manager who is considering to invest in doctors motivation anticipates that
to benefit from this, even in the long run, the additional profits of having intrinsically
motivated agents must overcome the addtional costs of motivate them somewhere in
time.
Our model shows that an intrinsically motivated doctor is willing to work for
lower overall pay. Thus P ’s benefits will be increasing when he decides to motivate
doctors s0 = S and decreasing when he decides not to motivate doctors. Therefore,
motivational capital profitability requires that the following condition holds once the
crowding effects have entirely happened.
w0t   wSt + 1(w0  wS) > S (3.39)
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Changes in each parameter of the model will affect the profitability of such the
investment on Motivational Capital. Then to study how these parameters affects the
benefits of investing in motivation will be a key question to find the conditions under
which a health manager may benefit from motivational capital. in the nexte sections
we analyze different cases.
Motivational Capital and Optimal Contracts
We want to establish a decision rule for P . He will take an action over s0 = f0; Sg
depending upon the total present profit that he can extract from each. Our analysis
of P ’s behaviour then begins with a comparison of the different values of the contracts
that he gets in with each decision. Let T be the number of periods that the game is
going to be played. We then have:
 S    0 =
TX
t=0
t

ESt   E0t

Looking at the above expression, the decision rule for P will be to choose s0 = 0
(pure monetary reward incentives) when S   0 < 0 and to choose s0 = S when
S   0 > 0.
As we can see, the above expression equals the expression (3.24), which reflects
the current net value of an investment made by P to generate motivation CNV mk.
P will then choose s0 = S in the case that CNV mk > 0 and will choose s0 = 0 in
the case that CNV mk 6 0.
We then establish the following result:
Proposition 7. Let T be the number of periods that the game will be played. Let L0 <
T and LS < T be the minimun number of time periods enough to allow crowding ef-
fects entirely happen for s0 = 0 and s0 = S respectively. If

w0t   wSt + 1(w0  wS)

>
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S with w0t = w0t   w0t and wSt = wSt   wSt , then there exists a threshold t such
that:
CNV mk =  S    0 =
tX
t=0
t

ESt   E0t

= 0
and for which
i. If t < T then CNV mk > 0 and P finds it profitable to invest in motivational
capital and choose the s0 = S strategy.
ii. If t > T then CNV mk 6 0 and P finds it profitable to not invest in motiva-
tional capital and chooses the s0 = 0 strategy.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the result using a particular case. The left side shows P ’s
expected profit functions for s0 = 0 and s0 = S. The right side shows the value of
the CNV mk as a function of time t. The t threshold determines the critical point
which determnes the best strategy for P .
Figure 3.3: Current Net Value of Motivational Capital. The graph shows
together the expected profit functions ESt and E0t , joint with the current net
value of motivational capital CNV mk. In t0 and tS the crowding effects ofb s0 = 0
and s0 = S are completed. The motivational investments profitability threshold t
shows the point at which the CNV mk becomes positive and therefore investing in
motivational capital s0 = S is the best choice for P
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CNV mk depends on P ’s time preference, which is captured in the model by the
parameter . Lower values indicate that the health manager puts more weight on
the present. Impatience therefore makes s0 = S less attractive.
Remark. A lower value of  means that the health manager is more focused on the
short term. This implies that t will be larger, consequently making any investment
of resources in motivational capital (i.e., implementing the s0 = S strategy) less
attractive to him.
This simple observation leads to an important discussion: the need for politically
independent managerial positions in health. The political cycle forces politicians and
consequently managers in health, to set short-term goals. They have a low  because
they put a lot of weight in the profits earned during the legislature. In contrast,
doctors are career professionals who have long- term goals in health provision. As
a result, politicians usually prefer to implement control and command policies and
monetary incentives rather than implementing motivational incentives or investing
in motivational capital (both of which are initially costly).
Depreciation Cost and Motivational Capital
A high depreciation cost  may make investments in motivational capital no optimal
at all.
Proposition 8. Let t0 < T and tS < T be the minimum number of periods enough
to allow crowding effects entirely happen for s0 = 0 and s0 = S respectively. Then,
taking S as constant, if  > [w
0
t wSt +1(w0 wS)]
S
, then CNV mk < 0 for all t = 1; 2; :::
and P never will find profitable to invest in motivational capital.
Proposition 8 states that when the depreciation cost is a higher fraction of the
initial invested amount in motivational capital than the fraction that expected ad-
ditional profits are over the same invested amount, then health manager never will
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invest in motivational capital because he will not expect any profit from this, neither
in the short nor in the long run.
Risk Aversion and Motivational Capital
In the model, agents are risk-averse and thereby receive contingent rewards linked
to performance qt. As A’s intrinsic motivation increases, fewer incentives and less
variation in payments are required in order to encourage him to exert high effort.
Less variation in payments indicates that A can be compensated with a lower risk
premium, and this constitutes another cost-saving source for the health organization.
Proposition 9 formally states that investing in motivational capital is more prof-
itable in the presence of risk-averse A:
Proposition 9. Investing in motivational capital is more profitable for P in presence
of risk-averse agents. Let A1 and A2 be a pair of agents with 1 and 2 intrinsic
motivation respectively. If the agents are risk-averse and 1 < 2, then the risk
premium will be lower in the case of A2 than in the case of A1. This additional
advantage in costs shortens t and consequently CNV mkt will earlier become positive.
The intuition behind this result is that incentives must be greater in order to
encourage high effort from agents without much intrinsic motivation. However, these
higher incentives raise the range between the low w and the high w payments. Given
that A is risk averse, the risk premium that P should offer to make the incentive
contract attractive for A will be higher. Analogously, intrinsically motivated agents
required fewer incentives to exert high effort. Consequently, she has to bear a lower
variance over payments and has to be compensated with a lower risk premium.
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Doctors’ Outside Options and Motivational Capital
When doctors have less options to employ out of the organization then, intuitively,
we may expect that investments in motivational capital would become less attractive
for the health manager. This is so because with less outside options (U = 0), the
low incentive payment ws0t required to incentivize doctors’ effort is equal to 0 due to
limited liability constraint (8).
Proposition 10. Investments in motivational capital will be less likely to be optimal
to the principal (health manager) when U = 0 and no outside options are available
to agents (doctors).
Proposition 10 states that in contexts with no outside options or with less likely
ones, incentivize high effort from doctors is less costly. Then, health managers will
find less attractive to invest in motivational capital and they will be more focused in
using only monetary incentives.
Information and Motivational Capital
Information affects motivational capital. Higher values of 0, or closer to 1 may
change the conditions under which investing in motivational capital is optimal. We
study how a poor correlation between effort and performance affects the decision of
investing in motivational capital.
Higher values of 0 increase incentive payments in expected terms. This is so,
by twofold reason: first because a poorer (more random) signal of doctors’ effort in-
creases doctors’ rent extraction power and, second, because doctors are risk averse.
In this context a reduction in incentive payments coming from having more intrinsi-
cally motivated doctors, result in a higher expected savings. Therefore, as mean as
performance becomes more random signal of effort, the profitability of investing in
motivational increase.
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Figure 3.4: Information and intrinsic motivation. Four different curves appear
in the figure. h(ut;1) and h(ut;1) show incentives for every value of 0 when the agent
has 1 intrinsic motivation. h(ut;2) and h(ut;2) show incentives for every value of
0 when the agent has 2 intrinsic motivation. In the figure we represent the case in
which 2 > 1.
Proposition 11. Whenever the LLC condition is applied, higher values of 0, more
close to 1 entail higher values of CNV mk.
Figure 3.4 illustrates proposition 11. The figure show how incentives respond
to an increment on 0. As it can be seen in the figure, an increment of the same
amount on 0 (0), generates an increment in incentive payment of lower magnitude
when the agent is more intrinsically motivated (wt;1 > wt;2). Then, investing
in motivational capital is more profitable in cases in which performance is a more
random signal of the agent’s effort.
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3.4 Conclusion
The following conclusions summarize the results of this work.
Results show that in the long run, to dedicate resources to crowd in doctors
intrinsic motivation, although costly at inception, will result more efficient than the
use of monetary incentives. However, if health care managers are focused on the short
run (legislative period), then they will have a tendency to choose purely monetary
rewards.
A health manager considering to invest or not in motivation will compute the
present value of the expected returns of both alternatives. As long as health manager
will have a lower discount factor more weight will put in the short run and less
attractive will find to invest in doctors’ motivation. This, strengthen the previous
conclusion.
In the model investments in motivational capital entails depreciation costs. If the
cost of depreciation is so large that the benefit from doctors intrinsic motivation can
not compensate it, then an investment in doctors’ motivation will not be optimal at
all for health manager.
Doctors outside options affect positively to the optimality of making investments
in motivational capital. Then, in public health, investments in motivational capital
will be more attractive in those medical specialties which have better outside options
in the private sector.
When doctors are risk-averse, investments in motivational capital are more likely
to be profitable for the health manager. When doctors are intrinsically motivated
they are paid with lower uncertainty to exert high effort and this result in a benefit
for the health manager.
Whenever doctors own a large amount of private information or performance
is a poor signal of effort, then investments in motivational capital are more prof-
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itable.This case is particularly interesting because in health, outcomes are hard to
measure and often the factors which determine them are not only doctors’ effort.
Furthermore, physicians are highly qualified professionals in areas of advanced and
complex knowledge. As a consequence, they own a large amount of private infor-
mation. Our results predict that health organizations are excellent candidates to
benefit from motivational capital investments due to the informational features that
characterize them.
Finally, other parameters and elements present in the model can offer information
to determine when motivational investments will be optimal for health manager. The
total surplus of contracts depend on the doctors’ intrinsic motivation distribution
function. The form of this distribution and how the crowding effects affect it, are
crucial to determine the effects produced by incentives  economic or motivational 
on the total welfare of all the members of the health organization. This is a field to
explore in depth that we consider for further research.
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Chapter 4
A Pilot Inquiry on Incentives and
Intrinsic Motivation in Health Care:
the Motivational Capital Explained
by Doctors
4.1 Introduction
Despite the huge amount of theoretical and experimental work, the lack of empirical
and field research and also the lack of natural experiments leave behavioral economics
unbalanced in the approach to the Economics of Organizations and Incentives. The
present chapter seeks to throw some light in this empirical test of theoretical im-
plications on the topic. Given the inherent difficulty to obtain data about intrinsic
motivation, identity and related concepts, we relied upon Qualitative Research meth-
ods using semi-structured interviews a-la-Bewley.
The objective of this chapter is twofold: first, we aim to find evidence in the
field about intrinsic motivation and second, we aim to find evidence about how these
motivations affect agents’ decisions and attitudes towards work through crowding
effects. We frame the research into health care organizations where, presumably,
agents (physicians) are intrinsically motivated to work in the provision of health.
More precisely, the hypotheses that we are seeking to test are the following: (1)
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Doctors are intrinsically motivated agents, (2) Economic incentives and control and
command policies may crowd out doctors’ intrinsic motivation and (3) There are
other incentives that may crowd in agents intrinsic motivation.
Finding confirmatory evidence on the above hypotheses may help us to inform
decision makers about the optimal design of incentives, regulations and policies which
will lead to better outcomes. Borrowing the words of Gneezy and List (2013) “Once
we understand what people value and why, we can develop effective incentives and use
them to [. . . ], motivate employees” (doctors). We forecast that in the case of health
this better outcomes could be an improvement in the efficiency and the effectiveness
with which health services are provided and an improvement in the quality of health
services.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Interviews
We performed in-depth semi-structured interviews a-la-Bewley Bewley (1999) to
physicians at Servicio Navarro de Salud-Osasunbidea (SNS-O) (n=16). Interviews
were undertaken over a sixteen-month period starting in February 2010. The ques-
tions addressed were open-ended and were written based on new theories coming
from Behavioral Economics Literature: intrinsic motivation and crowding effects,
identity, corporate culture and economics of information.
The place, date and time of the interview were always agreed with the intervie-
wees. Fixing date process is very important in order to obtain high-quality data.
Our main goal in dating always was to agree on a time when the interviewee would
have enough time and no other commitments (professional, family duties, or other)
waiting. We first started performing the interviews at the Department of Economics
at Public University of Navarre. We met with the interviewee in a quiet, calm and
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confortable room in order to create a wellcoming atmosphere that would facilitate
the natural course of the interview. But soon we realized that moving to the re-
spondents’ workplace would be a better strategy. Thus, we performed the rest of
interviews at doctors’ workplace, usually in their personal offices. This strategy eased
the dating process and resulted in a more natural and spontaneous behavior from
doctors during the interviews. Anyway, in all cases, doctors themselves decided on
location, time and day of the interview.
Doctors were invited to take part in the research through a formal invitation
letter1. The letter briefly informed on the contents of the meeting although no
details about the research goals were given to avoid biasing doctors’ answers. Letter
was sent jointly with a document of anonimity and confidentiality commitment2.
We asked doctors openly talk and judge the health care and the health organization
for which they were working and therefore we guaranteed anonimity in order to get
sincere and honest reviews. We allowed doctors a great deal of freedom in answering
to our questions. Doctors were keen on participating in the research and they were
happy to have the opportunity to openly give their view about the state of the
question. They gave their opinion in relation to the health care managers and their
management practices. We believe that the main reason why they cooperated was
the pleasure of talking to external academics about what they do day after day in
their jobs. Most people like to talk about themselves. This is a fact from which is
important to take advantage making interviews fun and interesting.
The duration of the interviews ranged from a minimun of 57 minutes to a max-
imun of 1 hour and 44 minutes. All interviews were performed by two of the authors
(MB and JMC) and were recorded using a mp4 recorder/player3. Despite it is very
1 Available from the authors upon request.
2 Available from the authors upon request
3 Samsung YP-T10
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time consuming, we personally did the interviews because it is very important to
take notes at the field. As long as the interviews progress, interviewees make ges-
tures, show emotions or feelings through face expressions, change their voice tone
and volume in relation with the question they are exposing and transmit changes in
their mood. To capture all these details improves significatively the quality of data
but requires the researchers presence in the interview in order to take notes. After
the field work done at the moment of the interview, we transcribed the recorded
audio to text document sentence by sentence. We typed all transcriptions as soon
as possible after the interview. This allowed us to remember, with the help of all
notes taken at field, all the details of the interview. This way we loss the minimun
relevant information and keep as high as possible the quality of obtained data.
All interviewees were doctors working at SNS-O. Our selection criteria was to
meet with highly qualified professionals, in high responsibility positions, and with
long tenure within health care system. Consequently all but one were experienced
senior staff, mostly men (fourteen out of sixteen), from a wide range of services. All
but three were working at hospitals. The remaining were working or had worked to
a private health care organization under public concertation, and in primary care
centers.
4.2.2 Analysis
Analysis stacks the information within categories and codes Corbin and Strauss
(2008). By category we mean “the higher-level concepts under which analysts group
other lower level concepts according to shared properties” , Corbin and Strauss (2008).
Categories represent the relevant phenomena that enables the analyst to group
whithin them the data coming from the qualitative concepts or evidence from field.
Categories are the dependent variables in the work. Categories are the outcomes
produced and explained by qualitative data. We ordered the categories involved in
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this work as follows: (i) Intrinsic Motivation, (i.a) Crowding out, (i.b) Crowding in,
(ii) Identity, (ii.a) Socialization and (ii.b) Conflict.
Codes are labels used to concentrate and homogeneize interviewees’ statements
or quotes. In each code homogeneous statements are grouped and all of them refer to
a concept which is related to a category. Each statement belonging to a given code is
an observation. Taken together, all observations belonging to a given code determine
the strength with which such a code serves as evidence for a given category.
Codes are of two types: deductive and inductive. Deductive codes are those
which have been defined and labelled on the basis of existing theories and literature
on the topic (category) that it is being analyzed. Think for instance in a code labeled
as autonomy. Self Determination Theory (SDT) Deci and Ryan (1985), Deci and
Ryan (2000a), Deci and Ryan (2000b) has established that autonomy (decision and
action) acts as a fuel for intrinsic motivation. Thus, we use a code labelled autonomy
to group under it all statements which allude to autonomy in relation to intrinsic
motivation or other category. Analogously, when the code emerged spontaneously
from respondents’ statements, then we classify it as inductive code. For instance,
doctors frequently say that economic incentives are effective only in the short run:
‘[...] people adapt to extra money [‘...]”, “[...] internalize extra earnings [...]”, “[...]
game the system and want more and more [...]”,. . . . Then, we label a code with the
word “Short run” to group under it all the statements which deal with the short-term
effectiveness of economic incentives.
Sometimes inductive codes are called “In-vivo” Birks and Mills (2011). This is
so when we label a code with a word that is of widespread use by informants in
the course of the research to refer to one specific fact or circumstance. For instance,
doctors often use the expression “Café para todos” 4 to point out that some incentives
4 For the remaining of the work, the traslation to English of such an expression, coffee for all will
be used to refer to the mentioned code
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implemented in the SNS neither discriminate, nor differenciate and, consequently, do
not recognize doctors who work at high level effort, interest and quality from those
who simply meet the minimun. Then, we label the code with the exact words used
by respondents to caught and count all those statements and other ones with the
same meaning.
A descriptive analysis and some quantification are shown within each category.
We explore the number of times and the frequency by which a given code appears
into the respondents’ discourse, the number of respondents who refer to a given
code in relation to a given category, or the observed pairwise correlation between
codes in reference to a given category. Some tables, figures and diagrams showing
quantification will be displayed to support results from the qualitative analysis. Some
additonal analysis has been done and more conclusions drawn from the classification
of all the statements into Positive or Normative.
We organized data using two kinds of documents: a set of commented transcrip-
tions and a set of spreadsheets. In the first, we add notes at the margin of each
transcription document. In each note we emphasize a quote from the transcription.
We label the selected quote with codes. We relate those codes with categories to
underline the connection between the informants’ statements and categories. We
point out the code and the category each quote belongs to. Figure 1 shows a piece of
a commented transcription. These commented transcription documents are the first
step in the data analysis.
Next, we transfer all these data from commented transcriptions to spreadsheets.
A first spreadsheet contains an individual sheet per respondent. We sort quotes in
rows, and categories and codes in columns. For every quote we proceed filling with
1 the cells corresponding with the codes and the category present in it and we fill
with a 0 the remaining. This way we generate a 0-1 matrix for each respondent that
allows us to quantify and collect information from interviews.
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Figure 1: An example of a commented transcription document.
A second spreadsheet is built to analyze the data and the quantification provided
by the first one. A single sheet is built for each category in which we develop a
general 0-1 matrix for this category. This allows us to count the times that each
code appears in the course of interviews related to a given category and also to set
interconnections between codes counting the number of times that emerge jointly
in reference to a given category. Using these inter-code relationships we establish
a simple hierarchy between codes. Finally, we generate other sheet in which we do
calculations with all the quantified data. For each category, we develop a series of
tables showing the probability of appearance of a given category conditional to the
positive or normative nature. This sheet also shows lists   one for each code   with
the number of respondents who mention at least one time a given code in relation to
a given category.
We define 37 codes which are briefly explained in the glossary (see annex). As
we said before, we classify each quote as positive or normative. If of a respondent’s
statement is a descriptive answer about health organization, conditions at workplace,
or the health care sector, we classify it as positive. Contrary, if the statement has
70
to do with the subjective view that respondent has about how the work, health or-
ganization and health care should be managed and organized, then we classify it
as normative. If a code appears almost all times as normative in the interviewees
discourses, then we interpret this as a signal showing which changes shold be imple-
mented within the health care organizations from the point of view of the physicians.
Analogously, if a given code appears almost all times as positive, then we interpret
this as a signal of the actual state of the picture concerning health care organization
at the moment in which the research was done.
We analyze data seeking evidence about physicians’ intrinsic motivation and ev-
idence of crowding effects: crowding-in and crowding-out. In the case of intrinsic
motivation we want to find out if doctors are intrinsically motivated professionals.
However, for crowding effects we are interested in setting which of the current poli-
cies, incentives or regulations implemented in the health care organization can be
considered of being crowding-out or crowding-in. Analyzing informants’ proposals
and experiences we also try to suggest ideas and proposals of innovative and imple-
mentable crowding in incentives, policies and regulations.
4.3 Results
A total number of 594 statements concerning to intrinsic motivation and crowding
effects were drawn from interviews. Figure 2 shows the distribution of all these
statements by categories.
4.3.1 Intrinsic Motivation
All interviewed physicians reported directly or indirectly intrinsically motivated ac-
tions and/or behaviors. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the number of intrinsic
motivation arguments mentioned by each interviewee.
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Figure 2: Crowding Out and economic incentives: distribution respondent by
respondent.
Figure 3: Number of intrinsic motivation statements distribution respondent by respondent.
Table 4.1 shows in the first column the codes which capture doctors’ statements
when they refer to intrinsic motivation. The second column shows the number of
doctors who mention at least once statements referring to each code joint with the
percentage between brackets. Third column shows the number and the percentage
of statements belonging to each code.
All interviewees made statements showing their joy from practicing medicine.
We capture all these statements into the code like/enjoy. Almost all doctors pointed
out that vocation drove they to medical practice. Humanity, or being effective in
alleviating human suffering was also pointed out as an inherent reward by almost
all doctors. Other medical specific tasks also appeared frequently in interviews as
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Table 4.1:
Are Physicians Intrinsically Motivated Professionals?
Code Respondents 16 (%) Statements 250 (%)
Like/Enjoy 16 (100,00%) 192 (76,80%)
Vocation 15 (93,75%) 48 (19,20%)
Humanity 15 (93,75%) 77 (30,80%)
Attractive profession 15 (93,75%) 91 (36,40%)
Service 13 (81,25%) 64 (25,60%)
Science 13 (81,25%) 61 (34,40%)
Technical knowledge 11 (68,75%) 27 (10,80%)
Further education 10 (62,50%) 26 (10,40%)
Recognition 10 (62,50%) 15 (6,00%)
Professional Development 9 (56,25%) 10 (4,00%)
Research 8 (50,00%) 21 (8,40%)
Challenge 8 (50,00%) 18 (7,20%)
Effort 8 (50,00%) 16 (6,40%)
Relatedness 7 (43,75%) 15 (6,00%)
Prestige 7 (43,75%) 10 (4,00%)
Passion 6 (37,50%) 12 (4,80%)
Empathy 6 (37,50%) 11 (4,40%)
Help 5 (31,25%) 12 (4,80%)
Pro-social 5 (31,25%) 7 (2,80%)
Dedication 5 (31,25%) 10 (4,00%)
Altruism 4 (25,00%) 6 (2,40%)
Teaching 4 (25,00%) 5 (2,00%)
The number of respondents who reported at least one statement of each code
and the percentage of respondents who reported statements of each code. Also the
number of statements within each code and their percentage of appearance relative
to the total number of statements.
attractive for doctors: service, science, research or help. Finally, there are arguments
caught by codes that are important although to a lesser extent. However, all of them
share in common that physicians have inner motivations beyond the monetary which
encourage them for work. From doctors’ statements we conclude that they are in-
trinsically motivated agents who like the medical practice or enjoy just from working
as physicians.
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Like/enjoy group doctors’ explanations which show their interest or joy towards
the medical practice. All respondents mentioned at least one time a statement related
with this code.
“...medical practice... is a practice in which... intellectual profits, affective profits
are obtained quickly.”
Respondent 1
“I find it very enjoyable to learn medicine and practice medicine when [. . . ] work-
ing as a physician. You do the things that attract you and if you like windsurfing [. . . ]
you are cold but you don’t feel it because you are doing windsurf. ”
Respondent 13
Vocation is another inner motivation that doctors feel. Doctors perceive them-
selves as innerly and innately oriented to medical practice.
“within emergency, I am not looking for anyone to thank me anything, is my work
and is what I want to do, then, I am happy just because I am doing it, what I have
chosen.”
Respondent 8
“I remember going into a hospital and it was a feeling... you feel that this is your
place.”
Respondent 15
Humanity is a key feature that characterizes doctors. Doctors report that they
enjoy and/or are vocationally driven to improve humans welfare and health. Humans
and their wellbeing are what almost all physicians feel to be a fundamental motivation
who encourages good work and is beyond money. They have a sense of being public
servants who contribute to people’s welfare.
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“I have experienced that people suffer much more with psychological things than
with physical pain. Whereupon... I want to be physician to relieve suffering and given
that the greatest suffering that there exist is the psychological suffering I dedicate myself
to this.”
Respondent 11
Service reflect the experienced joy from treating patients and helping them, is
another reason of being intrinsically motivated behaviors drew from doctors expla-
nations. We frequently found such reasons in their words.
“it is a global system ehm, so... that is... precisely the service... I understand it
unseparable from teaching and from research, clinical... where you see the problems
that you have read, that you have seen, you think about them and you research on
them... is very attractive.”
Respondent 14
Science and research, also seems to be key factors in the non-monetary motiva-
tions of doctors.
“I like also what I can do in research [. . . ] this overeffort, what I do because I like
it also, right? because actually this do not... that is, I do not gain anything, or little,
from that [. . . ] prestige or so if you want or open doors toward [. . . ] new worlds, new
perspectives”
Respondent 2
Doctors’ reported evidence about intrinsic motivation can be classified into two
families of codes: a first family having to do with psychological determinants that
predispose doctors toward medical practice, and a second family including codes
that encompass those tasks and features of the medical profession that doctors like
most to perform. We treat the first family of codes as the main psychological and
personal causes of doctors’ intrinsic motivation toward medical practice, that is,
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internal rewards that keep doctors motivated for work. On the other hand, we
treat the second family as the means to display, apply and keep high that intrinsic
motivation. In other words, the ways to perform in medical practice feeling joy from
working at the field.
Intrinsic
Motivation
250
Vocation
48
Like/Enjoy
192
(7)
(48) (192)
Humanity 77 Attractive
Profession 91
Challenge
18
Relatedness
15
(15) (77)(10)
(68)
(15) (13)
Figure 4: Numbers within nodes represent the number of quotes of the code.
Numbers between brackets displayed in arrows represent the number of times that
the codes connected by the arrow are quoted jointly. Dashed arrows connect codes.
Continuous arrows connect the two main codes with the Intrinsic Motivation category.
Figure 4 displays the first family of codes and their interconnections. This family
includes six codes classified into two levels. A first level containing like/enjoy and
vocation, the two main codes which explain doctors’ intrinsic motivation, and a sec-
ond level containing the other four codes which are closely related with the main two:
humanity, attractive profession, relatedness, and challenge. In the second family we
include codes which encompass the specifical tasks and/or features liked to perform
by doctors: service, help, dedication, empathy, research, science, technical knowledge,
professional development, further education or teaching, among others.
Next we analyze the connections that these first family of codes (determinants)
have with the second one. Attending to like/enjoy, some interesting relationships
with other codes are drawn. We summarize the most significative ones in table 2.
As seen in table 4.2, there seems to be two main dimensions of the medical
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Table 4.2: Intrinsic Motivation.
Which are the Determinants of Physicians’ Intrinsic Motivation?
Code Like/Enjoy (192) Percentage
Science 58 30,21%
Service 54 28,12%
Further Education 26 13,54%
Technical knowledge 25 13,02%
Research 20 10,42%
Help/Empathy 18 9,37%
The number of times and the frequency with which Like/Enjoy code appear jointly
with other codes referring to tasks and/or features of the medical practice.
practice which jointly form doctor’s intrinsic motivation: the human centered or
patient oriented part of the profession, and the technical knowledge or scientific
advance oriented part of the profession. Figure 5 shows how these two dimensions
relate with the different statements of interviewed doctors and the codes under these
statements.
Like/Enjoy
192
Human/Patient
Oriented
Science/Technique
Oriented
(70) (149)
Service 67
Help/Empathy
23
Science
61
Further
Education 26
Technical
Knowledge 27
Research
21
(14) (25)
(54)
(20)
(58) (26)
Figure 5: Codes are shown in the circle and ellipse nodes. Rectangle nodes
show the dimensions of intrinsic motivation. Connected with such dimensions the
figure shows the codes that emerge in each case. Numbers between brackets displayed
within each node represent the number of quotes of each code. Numbers between
brackets displayed in arrows represent the number of times that codes allude to each
source and the number of times each source explain doctors’ like/enjoy of medical
practice.
Doctors reported they enjoy or like medical practice because they help people
who suffer from illness and empathize with them.
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“[. . . ] doing something that you like... medicine actually has a part... of helping
people who are... therefore has a portion of reward. ”
Respondent 3
“Not only the technical or the scientific aspect of the profession of the medicine,
but also the human relation. To check that things are going well with some patients
and wrong or very wrong with others... to live such a, such a respect that life gives,
right? the death, the birth, etcetera... eh... anyway, all the affective and emotional
delights that may have... that may have the human relation.”
Respondent 10
Doctors expressed also their joy by practicing medicine, specifically when they
face science oriented medical activities and tasks like research, further education or
teaching.
“[. . . ] I think that medicine is extraordinary, there is a beast of a knowledge in a
current moment, the divulgation is tremenduous, the advance... is of a such magnitude
that... ”
Respondent 9
“Like a personal challenge, because difficult things attract me more than easy things
and, then I also like the professional challenge, of be able to advance and discover new
things, I like that very much.”
Respondent 6
Vocation, as explained before in this work, was also reported frequently by in-
terviewees when speaking about the motives which lead them to become doctors.
Vocation is a difusse concept that we use as a code because many times respondents
speak about it using this word literally. However we try to overcome this vagueness
of the vocation with other more precise concepts which jointly appear with it: ded-
ication, effort, service and help among others. Table 3 shows codes (features and
tasks) closely related with vocation.
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Table 4.3: Intrinsic Motivation.
Which are the Determinants of Physicians’ Intrinsic Motivation?
Code Vocation (48) Percentage
Service 12 25,00%
Help/Empathy 11 22,91%
Dedication 10 20,83%
Effort 7 14,58%
Pro-social/Altruism 7 14,58%
Codes closely related with vocation. Columns show the number of times and the
frequency with which the codes appear jointly with vocation.
Table 4.3 shows that vocation is mainly determined by patient and/or human
orientation. Despite some codes like science or technical knowledge also appear with
vocation, we have omitted them because their frequency of appearance is very low.
Therefore, vocation is a code mainly related with the human or patient oriented part
of the medical practice.
Attitudes towards work and the willingness to work out of hours in favor of pa-
tients without any associated payment, are frequently reported statements which
have to do with vocation. Doctors speak not only about their actions and ways to
behave but also about their beliefs on how an ideal physician should behave and the
sense of duty he should has.
“[. . . ] Further, I do things out of my work hours. So well, that doesn’t count [. . . ].
I think that I work too much. And then, I swallow all the nasty things that I have. I
mean, if all the patients fall into problems, I go to solve them, right? And yesterday,
at the evening I was (working) until very late, and the day before until eleven at night,
fighting with my things, which are my problems [...]”
Respondent 1
“the doctor should be empathetic, overall empathetic, empathetic. . . he must have
a huge capacity to be empathetic, because you have to put your feet in the shoes of who
is suffering, eh. . . and above of all, I think that you have to be a great communicator.” ’
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Respondent 16
Summing up, we conclude that doctors are intrinsically motivated to practice
medicine. They are professionals moved by intrinsic motives. Their professional
rewarding system goes beyond the external and expected monetary gain. From their
reporting we can also draw that they experience pleasure from practicing medicine.
Interviews show that doctors chose medicine moved by a feeling of vocation.
Another interesting finding is that doctors intrinsic motivation seems to be de-
termined by two separable dimensions: the patient or human oriented professional
activity and the scientific or technique oriented professional activity. In the first di-
mension, tasks like service or patient care out of hours and features like help others
or be empathetic with patients seems to be the most important ones. In the sec-
ond dimension, research activities, teaching, further education or acquiring technical
skills are the most important determinants.
Medical practice is subject to a great amount of responsibility which combines
with the necessity to make decisions with celerity in order to avoid negative health
consequences. Performing in tasks lik service or research produce effective results (re-
latedness) in saving lives, alleviate suffering, improve patients’ quality of life and/or
extend survival years of most severe pathologies. Doctors help patients and also
be empathetic with patients and their relatives. They have a strong sense of duty
toward performing at high effort level in their work. All of these ways to behave,
emerged in the course of interviews, are shared by almost all interviewed doctors
despite they will not be recognized with any explicit reward as a consequence.
4.3.2 Crowding Out
Evidence about the importance and the causes of the crowding-out effect was also
found. Interviewees made 157 arguments pointing out crowding-out. Figure 6 shows
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the distribution of the number of crowding out arguments mentioned by each inter-
viewee.
Figure 6: Crowding-out statements distribution respondent by respondent.
An observed regular fact that saturates5 rapidly is the crowding out nature of
the economic incentives. Despite respondents in their statements described multiple
channels through which economic incentives may cause crowding out, the fact that
money hurts doctors’ intrinsic motivation was shared by all.
Table 4.4, shows the number and the percentage of doctos who reported at least
once the codes shown in the first column. For instance, all doctors   sixteen or
hundreed percent   reported that economic incentives cause crowding out. Other
codes also shown in the table are: task meaning change, lack of recognition, ‘coffee
for all’, bureaucratization, ‘peonada’ 6 and control, among others. The third column
shows the total number and the percentage of quotes related to each code. For
instance, lack of recognition was quoted 68 times out of the 157   a 28,48%. As we
5 Saturation is a concept of widespread use in Qualitative Analysis Research literature Corbin
and Strauss (2008). A code is saturated when it emerges repeatedly in almost all interviews, and
always in the same explanatory or causal direction.
6 The name with which an extra payment scheme implemented by SNS-O is commonly known.
This payment scheme consists in a Fee-For-Service (FFS) payment that is offered to physicians
for working out of hours. The goal of this FFS payment scheme is to reduce waiting lists under a
previously determined threshold.
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Table 4.4: Crowding out
Do Monetary Incentives and other Command and Control Policies
Crowd out Physicians’ Intrinsic Motivation?
Code Respondents 16 (%) Statements 157 (%)
Economic Incentives 16 (100%) 144 (91,72%)
Task Meaning Change 15 (93,75%) 68 (43,03%)
Lack of Recognition 14 (87,5%) 45 (28,48%)
‘Coffee for All’ 12 (75%) 31 (19,62%)
Bureaucratization 11 (68,75%) 31 (19,62%)
‘Peonada’ (FFS) 11 (68,75%) 23 (14,55%)
Control 11 (68,75%) 21 (13,29%)
Profesional career 9 (56,25%) 13 (8,23%)
Opportunistic Behavior 8 (50%) 21 (13,29%)
Market Transaction 8 (50%) 17 (10,75%)
Lack of Autonomy 7 (43,75%) 12 (7,59%)
Damage to prosocial image 5 (31,25%) 10 (6,32%)
The frequency with which respondents indicated the different codes that point
out the existence of crowding out effect and its causes.
shall see, most codes shown in table 4 are closely related with economic incentives
and the reasons by which economic incentives cause crowding-out.
Doctors expressed many statements referring to the crowding-out nature of eco-
nomic incentives.
“[. . . ] you get used that to develop a given task you need a given economic incen-
tive... and it is likely to arrive to perverse situations... that I can tell you.”
Respondent 4
Residents (Physicians) leave very early... they don’t work extra hours or if they
do, they call these hours overtime... when we did extra hours, these were, were, were...
well done. I never thought to claim for overtime to nobody... then there are people
who, I think they start to working exactly like past times but by reasons that would be
they throw the towel (give up) earlier and, and there is a higher percentage of people
who say, well, this is going to become in a, in a work rather than a vocation.
Respondent 13
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Economic incentives were mentioned as a cause of crowding-out   144 out of
157 times. Having a statement that points out the existence of crowding out, the
probability that this statement refers to some kind of economic incentive is high
and close to 1. This is not surprising and it is consistent with what the theory in
economics and psychology predicts ?, Frey and Jegen (2001), Deci (1971), Deci et al.
(1999).
Besides economic incentives, control is the other main code related with crowding
out. We consider these two because all the times that any statement belonging to
one of them emerges in the course of an interview, it directly points out to crowding
out. Furthermore, the jointly appearance proportion of economic incentives (10/144)
and control (10/21) are low. We interpret this low frequency in co-occurrence as an
evidence of being independent explanations or causes of crowding out.
Other codes which explain crowding out emerge jointly with economic incentives
or control frequently in the course of interviews. This is the case for instance of lack
of autonomy, ‘peonada’, market transaction, profesional career, damage to prosocial
image or bureaucratization.
Crowding-out
156
Control 21
Lack of
Autonomy 12
(21)
(12)
Economic Incentives
144
(144)
Lack of
recognition
45
(42)
‘Cafe´-para-todos’
31
(22)
Professional
Career 13
(6)
(13)
Change in Task
Meaning 68
(67)
Opportunistic
Behavior 21
(20)
Market
Transaction 17
(17)
‘Peonada’ 23
(15)
Damage to
Prosocial
Image 10
(10)
Bureaucratization
31
(31)
(10)
(8)
Figure 7: Relations Between Codes Referring to Crowding Out.
Figure 7, shows how the different codes related to crowding out interact between
them. Numbers within nodes refer to the number of statements belonging to the
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Table 4.5: Crowding out.
Are there other reasons in combination of economic incentives
that reinforce the crowding out effect?
Code Economic incentives (144) Percentage
Task Meaning Change 67 46,52%
‘Peonada’ 15 (22,05%)
Opportunistic Behavior 20 (29,85%)
Market Transaction 17 (25%)
Lack of Recognition 42 29,17%
‘Coffee for all’ 22 (48,89%)
Bureaucratization 31 21,52%
Professional Career 13 9,02%
Damage to Prosocial Image 10 6,94%
The number of times and the frequency with which the different codes appear
jointly with the main code of economic incentives and referring to crowding out. The
codes showed in the table below of task meaning change and lack of recognition, and
justified to the right, are those which appears most times joint with the code just
above of them.
code of such a node. Numbers between brackets out of nodes refer to the number of
statements which belong either to the code of the node and to the code connected
by the arrow. For instance, in the figure it can be seen that there are 45 statements
showing lack of recognition, and, at the same time, 42 out of these 45 also refer to
economic incentives at the same time.
Table 4.5 displays how economic incentives combine with other codes in explain-
ing crowding-out. Two of these combinations are particularly interesting. The first is
when economic incentives combines with task meaning change. Task meaning change
is present in 68 statements and combines with economic incentives in 67 times out
of the 144. The second is when economic incentives combines with lack of recogni-
tion. Lack of recognition is present in 45 statements and combines with economic
incentives in 42 times out of 144.
From Social Psychology we know that recognition is one of the main determinants
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of the intrinsic motivation7. In the course of interviews doctors frequently showed
feelings about being poorly recognized by the actual effort they exert in medical
practice. They consider that the current system of rewards in SNS-O is far from
recognizing their work and effort as it should be. We capture such feeling with
the code lack of recognition. The combination of lack of recognition and economic
incentives seems to be an important cause of crowding-out.
Other important cause in the explanation of crowding-out that combines with
economic incentives is task meaning change. Behavioral Economics ? shows that
incentives frame the decision situation so as to suggest the appropiate behavior.
When economic monetary incentives are offered to doctors, they may change their
subjective view towards work an move their mind into an economic interaction frame
behaving like an economic agent would do, leaving out intrinsic motives.
In table 4.5, there are other codes containing information about the causes and
the determinants of task meaning change and lack of recognition. The first is related
with ‘peonada’, opportunistic behavior and market transaction. The second is related
with ‘coffee for all’ 8.
Opportunistic behavior occurs when agents act seeking her maximun monetary
payoff regardless whether this behavior contributes or not to achieve the goal aimed
by the principal. Doctors frequently reported about opportunistic behavior as doc-
tors’ reactions to ‘peonada’. Opportunistic behavior, ‘peonada’ and Market transac-
tion   that refers to the change in the perception of the task from social act to pure
job   are closely related to task meaning change.
Finally, damage to prosocial image occurs when intrinsically motivated agents
feel that being monetarily rewarded may change the image that they project to the
7 See Deci and Ryan (2000a) and Deci et al. (1999)
8 A common expression used to describe situations where a group of individuals or institutions
are treated equally irrespective of their individual efforts, necessities or results.
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society and they start to feel that society view them as greedy agents or, even worse,
they start to view themselves as greedy agents ?.
The mixing of economic incentives with task meaning change or lack of recognition
are the most explicative reasons for crowding out.
‘I perhaps don’t generate intentionally that waiting list. But there exists. As a
consequence I must be paid for two afternoons, that it is a gift and is money. I have
no incentive to make the waiting list to dissappear, and,... and I should have that
incentive (incentive to reduce the waiting list) because it would be a good thing that
the waiting list would dissapear... is a good thing, that means that we are working
better.
Respondent 13
“[. . . ] waiting lists are absolutely overgrowth, and generate waiting list is very easy
also [. . . ] ‘peonada’, as an incentive? the problem is, rather than icentive I think that
it can be a perversion... of the issue.”
Respondent 3
In table 4.6, there are two other interesting codes. Bureaucratization on the one
hand, and professional career on the other. The first, reveals that the current con-
tractual frame under which the labor relationship between health professionals and
health organizations is established, is by itself a cause of crowding-out of economic
nature. The second reflects the fact that the SNS-O’s implemented incentive scheme
called professional career, causes crowding-out.
Related to bureaucratization doctors frequently referred to this process point-
ing out that agents lose their interest towards medical profession and accommodate
themselves and behave as salaried public workers. Doctors’ statements frequently
showed bureaucratization as a result of treating all agents equally with no incentive
  neither monetary, nor non-monetary   in order to reward professional excellence
or other merits.
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In the case of professional career, however, doctors pointed out that professional
career fails as an incentive mechanism because its requisites are reached by all with-
out doing any effort (by the mere passage of time) and therefore, don’t recognize
any professional achievement. Thus the professional career currently implemented
in SNS-O is viewed by doctors as an economic complement that neither incentivize
nor motivate and even worse, may crowd out the intrinsic motivation of the highly
motivated professionals.
“[. . . ] in the system that we are, I say... we are all equal and the equality is
downward. That is, the equality is achieved down, never up. Then, when you spent
some years, we all are paid the same, we leave the work with the same timetable,
and you start to realize that whether you view forty patients and you write a research
project, and you study, and you publish. . . doesn’t matter, you are treated equal than
the guy who is working besides you, the same that you watch arriving to workplace at
quarter to nine, that at quarter past two is leaving, that shirks to asist patients...”
Respondent 15
...now, the professional career we have is also rubbish, because you seat at your
chair for fourteen years, and you advance [. . . ] I don’t go out of my office for a period
of fourteen years and I advance, [. . . ] Apart from the fact that if I go up of professional
category is rewarded by a infimum or mediocre economic incentive, which, at the end,
you don’t do for that.
Respondent 13
Table 4.6: Crowding out
Control causes crowding-out.
Code Control (21) Percentage
Lack of Autonomy 12 57,14%
The number of times and the frequency with which lack of autonomy emerges
joint with control referring to crowding out.
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Control is the other main cause of crowding-out in SNS-O’s health organizations.
However, it is of less importance than economic incentives. This minor importance
of control relative to economic incentives has to do with the fact that it is hard to
control physicians and their practice because they own a high amount of complex
private information. Doctors told that in many cases they perceived control from
managers in some of their medical practice. They often perceive the incentives or the
policies implemented as ways to drive the doctors towards managerial goals without
taking into account doctors’ ones. Interviewees also informed about a high degree of
unilateralism in the decision making processes (setting objectives, future planning,...)
of health care and health organizations. Doctors perceived this unilateralism as a
lack of autonomy (12) which demotivates them.
“At the end of the year budgets are cut off...“there is not so much freedom ...”
perhaps “to do do many surgeries”, because the manager gives the order to control,
and “cut off the expenses.”
Respondent 6
“[. . . ] in our culture to be tough, tough, and... to control... to be ‘controller’
authorizes you more than other models of management of higher uncertainty. [. . . ]
that kind of management, I think that generates much resistence in collectives like
this, in such qualified people, who don’t want to hear from you what they must do and
who they want that you leave them margin to act. Then, there, there is a point of
friction.
Respondent 16
Finally, we are going to put our results in relation to the crowding-out literature.
Behavioral Economics ? and Social Psychology Deci and Ryan (1985), establish
several mechanisms through which economic incentives may cause crowding-out of
agents’ intrinsic motivation. The results of this work fit with three of them: (i)
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incentives provide information about the principal who implemented them, (ii) in-
centives frame the decision situation so as to suggest appropriate behavior and (iii)
incentives compromise control averse individual’s sense of autonomy.
Our results are consistent with the first mechanism. Doctors shape beliefs about
the type of management they are dealing with using incentive and payment schemes
implemented in SNS-O as informative signals. In the course of the interviews the
lack of recognition (45), profesional career (13), ‘coffe-for-all’ (31) and ‘peonada’ (23)
throw confirmatory evidence about the first mechanism. Information provided by pay
structures and incentives help doctors to ascertain management’s goals. We observe
that doctors view health management distant, disinterested, far from the doctors’
objectives and focused only in their own goals (reduce waiting lists, reduce health
expenditure, projecting a good image to the electorate showing great interventions
through the media and so on).
Doctors often made statements which evidence this first mechanism:
“Professional career is a... well is an overpay... that management invents to
compensate, to compensate a little. Then, is made without any criteria of quality...”
Respondent 14
“The major priority is the cost adjustment... as a function of the numeric valu-
ation... nobody questions himself if you are doing the things well or if you are doing
the things wrong...
Respondent 4
“[. . . ] complementary actitvity earned (professional career) by category. And thus
I am in a hospital and thus I am... but here all is... here to extinguish the waiting list
is all of the picture. ”
Respondent 9
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The second mechanism refers to how the incentive can frame the health management-
doctor relation in a pure economic principal-agent interaction. When dealing with
an economic incentive, intrinsically motivated agents may change their mind starting
to see the activity or the task in which they are performing as an economic trans-
action. Such change is what we capture with the codes task meaning change (67)
and bureaucratization (31). Rewarded to do extra effort or granted with fixed secure
positions, doctors, might start perceiving the social valuable task of helping others
as a commodity subject to the labor market rules, with wages and payments being
the market price. This change in the perception may disappoint them hurting their
intrinsic motivation. This reason also lead us to include market transaction (17)
as another code with explanatory power. Codes like opportunistic behavior (21) or
‘peonada’ (23) also provide evidence about this second mechanism.
Doctors told that in many cases colleagues start to behave following pure eco-
nomic motives in reaction to incentives or payment schemes:
“[. . . ] you just do the ‘peonada’ and after that if the waiting list fall or not...
is not your problem [. . . ] the problem is the waiting list by per se and no that the
activity grows just because. Of course if they tell you, ‘your activity have to increase’,
you think,‘ok, ok, it will increase but I can operate people who maybe do not... who is
in the limit of the necessity to be operated or not’
Respondent 2
“I don’t make ‘peonadas’ because I don’t believe... I don’t view myself in... that
isue of money. There are people, physicians, and no physicians, nurses, auxiliars and
all the people, who, given that ‘peonadas’ are so well paid, they start o think that to
do one or two ‘peonadas’ per week compensates because are very well paid, and doing
these is usefull for your expenses, for your son’s university, or for any other thing.
And that, perverts... perverts the system. Perverts the system.
Respondent 8
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Self Determination Theory Deci and Ryan (1985) and Deci et al. (1999) estab-
lishes that this mechanism may occur in strategic situations where incentives convey
the desire of a principal to control the agent. From this third mechanism we would
expect that incentives may compromise control averse doctors’ sense of autonomy.
As doctors often told in the course of interviews, they view ‘peonadas’, professional
career or other managerial decisions as tools, designed unilaterally by management,
to drive doctors actions.
In doctors’ words, incentives, pay structures and managerial decisions which con-
straint doctors’ autonomy or which were perceived as controlling may cause crowding-
out :
“when we did ‘peonadas’, many of my mates... ‘but if I don’t want to do ‘peonadas’,
after be at work in the morning, I don’t want to be also at work in the afternoonÕ
Respondent 2
“ ‘Peonada’? within our unit, nobody wants to do. Because. . . there are units that
want to do. This also strongly depends on the units, But our unit, is a unit of women,
practically, there are two men only. And this, you know? women, children, married,
anything else,... that is... is different from men, eh. And they don’t want to do
‘peonadas’. They don’t want. Young people, that we talked about they before, I have
some young people in the unit who what they want to do is to research, to study, to do
anything else... and they don’t want to spend the afternoon here reviewing patients’
medical records which don’t add anything to you. Because medical records does not
add anything to me.
Respondent 15
4.3.3 Crowding In
The last category we test in this work is crowding-in. Interviewees made 172 state-
ments pointing out crowding-in. Figure 8 shows the distribution of these statements
respondent by respondent.
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Figure 8: Crowding-out statements distribution respondent by respondent.
Respect to crowding-in a fact that saturates rapidly is that it is mainly caused
by non-economic incentives. In the course of interviews just a few experiences of
crowding-in were explained. However a lot of proposals and ideas of crowding-in
were proposed. This imbalance offers a precise picture of the current state of health
organizations in SNS-O.
Table 4.7 shows the codes related to crowding-in. The main code explaining
this category is non-economic incentives. Under this code all the statements which
expressed proposals or experiences of non-economic incentives were included. Non-
economic incentives is also related with almost all the other codes. That is, almost all
statements included in it emerged jointly with other codes among which recognition,
autonomy, professional development, research or further education seem to be the
most important ones. All these codes or labels refer to incentive methods alternative
to the economic incentives. Therefore all of these methods should be considered in
the design of new incentive schemes.
Recognition appears frequently in doctors explanations with the meaning of be-
ing a potential and an effective incentive. In some cases also emerged jointly with
economic incentives as a way to complement these in order to change their nature
from crowding-out to crowding-in. Usually doctors claim for new incentives which
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Table 4.7: Crowding In
Are there incentives schemes, pay schedules or other non-economic rewards
which may cause crowding in?
Code Respondents 16 (%) Statements 172 (%)
Non-economic Incentives 16 (100%) 157 (91,28%)
Recognition 16 (100%) 49 (28,49%)
Autonomy 13 (81.25%) 50 (29,06%)
Professional Development 14 (87.5%) 38 (22,09%)
Research 10 (62.5%) 37 (21,51%)
Further Education 10 (62.5%) 29 (16,86%)
Economic Incentives 9 (56.25%) 15 (8,72%)
Service 8 (50%) 10 (5,81%)
Auto-Organization 8 (50%) 22 (12,79%)
Relatedness 7 (43.75%) 12 (6,98%)
Professional Career 7 (43.75%) 12 (6,98%)
Science 6 (37.5%) 17 (9,88%)
Flexibility 6 (37.5%) 16 (9,3%)
Teaching 4 (25%) 13 (7,56)%
Agree Objectives 4 (25%) 10 (5,81%)
Codes of crowding-in. The number of doctors who at least make one statement
related to each code and the percentage is shown in the second column. The third
column shows the number of statements referring to each code and the percentage.
will be useful to differentiate or positively discriminate physicians following quality,
excellence or other merit based criteria.
“we all are different, each one have his capabilities, his motivations, and that has
to be reflected, right? that is no, no. . . uniformity doesn’t stimulate, right? to. . . to the
people, right? that is. . . you have to recognize the differences.”
Respondent 2
“Sometimes is preferable to be pated on the back and be told what well you have
done, this year you operate a lot. . . and results have been excellent. [. . . ] that is, being
told what well you have done, being told, ‘hey!. . . do you want to go to this place to
learn a new technique?’.”
Respondent 5
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Giving more autonomy to professionals seems to be potentially another good non-
economic incentive. Doctors frequently asked for more autonomy to manage their
work at workplace and adjust the work burden to their personal circumstances and
interests. To offer this possibility as much as possible, could motivate physicians for
work and encourage their intrinsic motivation.
“. . . in the scope of the. . . of the autonomy. . .more freedom in management. . . in
the management of your activity, that would be at professional’s level, as it is. Or at
organization’s level, you know? of how you manage yourself. . . ”
Respondent 4
“be able to manage the unit of service, that is to be able to deal managerial agree-
ments with the hospital management, in which you can make a proposal of this year
plan, ‘we are going to do that, with. . . ’ right?with this kind of incentives.”
Respondent 15
Research is another incentive which appears often in the course of interviews.
Some doctors refer to basic research others to applied clinical research, and a few told
about the need for linking hospitals to the university as one big policy which would
result in a better quality of research, technical advance and scientific knowledge.
Doctors refer to these issues as ways different to the economic which could motivate
them.
“It would not be necessarily monetary. . . instead of being told that they say to me,
we are going to disapear the waiting list and you will see all patients the next day,
right? if you achieve that goal, eh. . . we organize a unit of clinical trials, equiped with
three nurses, two data managers, and in addition we release the fifty per cent of two
of your assistants. . . I watch such a big carrot. . . ”
Respondent 13
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Finally the last code that we shall analyze from table 7 is professional devel-
opment. This code reveals the limited possibilities that doctors have to develop a
professional career, to grow as physicians, expand their activities and knowledge and
promote. In the interviews they consider the expansion of these possibilities as a
potential incentive which may boost their intrinsic motivation.
. . . from that money a fifteen percent was extracted for the institution, and twenty
percent for the ‘residents’ fund’. That was a thing. . . that. . . that was, because the
‘residents’ fund’, what stimulates was that residents published, and present things.
And then, there was a congress, then what you present were watched and the interest
in. . . travel expenses were paid to him.”
Respondent 12
Remaining codes of the table 4.7 also explain many crowding-in features and also
propose many crowding-in incentives design. However we will analyze relations be-
tween codes to establish which of them are catching the same or similar phenomenon.
The first remarkable thing is the prevalence of the non-economic incentives as the
main cause of crowding-in. The second is that the combination of economic in-
centives with recognition, also may cause crowding in. Finally, we want to remark
also that the redesign of the professional career could transform this crowding-out
incentive scheme into a crowding-in one.
Table 8 shows between codes relationships. That is, which codes appear at the
same time with a given statement in the course of interviews and also how many
times appear jointly and relative to the times that they emerge in total.
Looking at table 4.8 we first say that the main code that may be on the basis of
crowding-in is non-economic incentives. From all statements referring to crowding-in,
91,28% of them are pointing out to some kind of non-economic incentives. The rest
of the codes which appear in table 8 can be considered alternative ways to incentivize
doctors without money.
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Table 4.8: Crowding In
Are there incentives schemes, pay schedules or other non-economic rewards which
may cause crowding in?
Code Crowding-in (172) Percentage
Non-Economic Incentives 157 91,28%
Autonomy 45 28,66%
Self-management 21 46,67%
Recognition 43 27,39%
Research 36 22,93%
Science 13 36,11%
Professional development 36 22,93%
Further education 13 16,11%
Relations between crowding-in codes. In the first level to the right, first column
shows the codes which appear jointly with non-economic incentives. In the second
level, even further to the right, first column shows the codes which appear jointly
with the first level ones. Second column shows the number of times that each code
in the first level to the right appears jointly with non-economic incentives, and also
the number of times that each code in the second level appears jointly with the code
of the first level just above in the table. Relative precenteges are shown in the third
column.
Autonomy was quoted 45 times (28,66%) to be a non-economic incentive which
may cause crowding-in. Leaving professionals acting at the workplace with more free-
dom and with a sense of behaving with autonomy seems to be a way to foster doctors’
intrinsic motivation. More precisely, when doctors claimed for more autonomy they
meant self-management of time, task schedule or work goals and objectives.
Research activities also emerged often (22,39%) in the course of interviews as a
potential non-economic incentive. Research include the interest through science that
share many of the doctors. When they claim more research activities, sometimes they
speak about clinical trials, or facilities to spend research visits in other institutions,
facilities to collaborate with other research groups and to publish, research assistance
or time to do research within hospitals at working time.
Another form of non-economic incentive that doctors report is professional devel-
opment (22,93%). In doctors’ words, currently the possibility to develop a career into
SNS-O is very low and there are no facilities to professional development. In their
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view to set some criteria in order to give opportunities to develop a career and push
up doctors to grow as professionals is crucial to motivate physicians. Frequently, 13
times out of 36 (16,11%), when doctors speak about professional development they
point out to further education.
Recognition is also something that doctors’ claim. Being recognized could be
a good non-economic incentive looking at doctors’ explanations. As we saw in the
previous section of this work, professional career is, in its current design, an incentive
scheme that fails to recognize the merits and/or the excellence of the professionals.
Is an incentive that treat equally all doctors: the “good” and the “bad”. This lack
of recognition is perceived negatively and hurts professionals’ intrinsic motivation.
However, almost all respondents believe that a well designed professional career,
which will recognize the effort, the excellence and quality, would do a lot in motivating
doctors and pushing all the staff toward a norm of good practice at high quality
standards.
All the relevant relationships between crowding-in category and non-economic
incentives in their different forms are captured in figure 7.
4.3.4 Crowding-in in the field: what it is and what it should
be
More insights can be drawn analyzing the normative or positive nature of state-
ments and the information that this classification provides to evaluate the degree of
crowding-out within the SNS-O. As we explained above, all the statements drawn
from the interviews were classified into normative and positive. As normative we
labelled hypothetical statements referring to how things should be or could be in the
SNS-O. As positive we labelled descriptive statements that refer directly to the actual
state of the SNS-O. We use this information to determine if current management in
the SNS-O is causing crowding-out or not. Our approach is as follows: if the fraction
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Crowding-In
172
Non-economic
incentives 157
Professional
development 38
Autonomy
50
Research 37
Recognition
49
(157)
(36) (45)(36)
(43)
Self-
management 22
Further
education 29
Science 17
(21)(13)(13)
Figure 7: Rectangle form node show the category: crowding-in. Codes are shown
in the rest of the nodes. Connected with the category the figure shows non-economic
incentives. Numbers displayed within each node represent the number of quotes of
each code. Numbers between brackets displayed in arrows represent the number of
times that a given code appears jointly with the other code that is connected with it
by the arrow.
of all statements referring crowding-out that were classified as positive is close to one,
then it can be interpreted as evidence of management causing crowding-out. This
result will be more consistent if comparing with crowding-in if the reverse happens.
We calculate the probability of having a positive (normative) statement knowing
that it is a statement referring to crowding-in for each respondent i = 1; 2; :::; 16,
using the following expression:
Pj(p|ci) =
Pj(ci|p)  Pj(p)
Pj(ci|p)  Pj(p) + Pj(ci|n)  Pj(n)
Where p means positive, n normative and ci crowding-in. Then Pj(cijn) will be
the probability for any normative statement of the respondent i of referring also to
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Table 4.9: Crowding in
Measuring crowding-in degree in the SNS-O through probabilities.
Respondents Weight Probability Probability
positive (weighted) normative (weighted)
1 0.0606 0.0071 (0.0005) 0.9928 (0.0750)
2 0.0774 0.2551 (0.02818) 0.7448 (0.0822)
3 0.0723 0.1185 (0.0103) 0.8814 (0.0768)
4 0.0572 0.5000 (0.0290) 0.5000 (0.0290)
5 0.0690 0.0745 (0.0039) 0.9254 (0.0484)
6 0.0336 0.1000 (0.0023) 0.9000 (0.0209)
7 0.0555 0.0588 (0.0034) 0.9412 (0.0547)
8 0.0808 0.1997 (0.0162) 0.8003 (0.0651)
9 0.0740 0.1000 (0.0069) 0.9000 (0.06279)
10 0.0639 0.0986 (0.0051) 0.9013 (0.04716)
11 0.0454 0.5000 (0.0174) 0.5000 (0.0174)
12 0.0572 0.8105 (0.0612) 0.1895 (0.0143)
13 0.0707 0.1358 (0.0071) 0.8642 (0.0452)
14 0.0387 0.1000 (0.0023) 0.9000 (0.0209)
15 0.0808 0.5671 (0.0560) 0.4329 (0.04278)
16 0.0622 0.9140 (0.0425) 0.0859 (0.0039)
TOTAL 0.2837 (0.2929) 0.7162 (0.7071)
Respondent by respondent weighted probabilities of having a positive/normative
statement conditional to being a crowding-in statement.
crowding-out and Pi(n) will be the probability for any statement of respondent i of
being normative9.
We also calculate respondent specific weights,
W ici =
sici
Sci
Where sjci refers to the number of crowding-in statements made by the respondent
j, and Sci refers to the total number of crowding-in statements drawn from the inter-
views. Using weights we have the weighted probability of a positive statement condi-
9 Analogously we have the other probabilities of the expresision: Pi(cijp) will be the probability
for any positive statement of the respondent i that refers to crowding-out and Pj(p) will be the
probability for any statement of respondent i of being positive.
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tional to be crowding-in. Table 9 shows the probability of being positive/normative
for any statement or quote which refers to crowding-in. With these probabilities we
want to measure the crowding-in degree of the current management in the SNS-O.
Probabilities are calculated for each interviewee, and then added to obtain the total
probability weighting by respondent or calculating the average.
Probabilities in table 4.9 show that crowding-in is, in words of the respondents,
predominantly a normative phenomenum. The probability for a crowding-in state-
ment to be normative is P (pjci)  0:7. That is, when doctors make an statement
pointing out crowding-in the probability of such an statement of being some advice
or opinion about how things should be is near 70%. In other words, there is more
work to do in fostering doctors’ intrinsic motivation than is currently being done.
But fortunately this is not the whole of the picture. Looking at table 9 doctor by
doctor some remarkable numbers jump to our view. More precisely the probabilities
corresponding to respondents 11, 12, 15 and 16. The first two correspond to two
senior doctors who speak openly about their experiences rather than of their ideas
or ideals. Having spent long time in positions with managerial responsibilities and
working at high levels of autonomy, they were inclined to speak about succesfull
actions, organizative changes they implemented.
We found a particularly interesting case of respondents 15 and 16. During a
period of time, one of them held a management position at hospital and the other
was head of a unit. During this period they started to bargain and agree upon
unit objectives and goals. They were successful in reducing waiting lists without
making ‘peonadas’. In words of the respondent who was the head of that unit that
was the result of giving to professionals more autonomy and extend their working
hours possibilities. Also, it was a consequence of organizing autonomous teams and
mutidisciplinary workgroups. These teams worked on each case at a high cooperation
rate from a multidisciplinary approach. The changes implemented changed the mind
100
and the mood of the medical staff. Doctors in the unit started to feel themselves part
of the picture because they started to participate in the design of objectives and also
in the goal-setting process. Among these objectives also managerial specific ones
were included (waiting lists, reducing costs,. . . ) and doctors committed on them,
but in exchange they perceived more facilities to work on their research projects,
to attend conferences and courses or to publish papers. Many of their statements
described this.
The following quotes took from respondent 15 and respondent 16 may help to
illustrate this last case.
“. . . there where people who, eh. . . , that I knew that they were able to offer more
from the research point of view, or grants, or. . . and I gave to them more hours. . . to
that. While other people, were attending more patients. ‘You don’t want to do research.
You don’t want to apply for aid, so you will attend more patients. I am going to give
more time to the ones for that to the other. To give him more chances to do his
things’, right? There I discriminated”.
Respondent 15
“What I try to do in the unit. . . is to offer to people much ability for, for,. . . that
is, to strengthen the development, right? the professional development. . . within the
unit, there are also non-economic incentives, but within the pathologies of, of. . . to give
conferences, attend to places (conferences) congresses, of. . . right?”
Respondent 15
“Free time is starting to appear joint with the work-life balance. Once the profes-
sion is feminized, there is a new. . . even in men also, the issue of enjoying from. . . ...
more auto-organization (self-management) is starting to come. Is becoming a very
important question.”
Respondent 16
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4.4 Concluding Remarks
Doctors are intrinsically motivated toward medical practice because they express to
like and enjoy medicine. They are willing to put extra effort in profesional perfor-
mance even in absence of external rewards or in exchange of low ones. Vocation is
another determinant of doctors’ intrinsic motivation. Despite its incidence is lower
than the pleasure from practicing medicine, vocation also makes doctors feel well
from performing at health care.
Doctors’ intrinsic motivation seems to be two-dimensional. Doctors like or en-
joy from technical or scientific oriented tasks of medical practice, on the one hand,
and also like or enjoy human or patient oriented tasks of medical practice, on the
other. Related with the former, doctors consider medicine as an attractive profes-
sion because it involves activities like research, learning to acquire further education
or technical skills, improving methods and drugs, teaching and so on. The latter
involves the welfare of patients as human beings. In this case doctors express that
they like or enjoy their work because they help people, they have to empathize with
patients in trouble, they work providing a social valuable good and they view them-
selves as prosocial agents.
With respect to intrinsic motivation, we conclude that doctors motivations to-
wards work and medical practice go beyond the purely economic ones. Therefore the
design of optimal incentive schemes should take into account these internal motiva-
tions.
Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation are not independent. Then neglect-
ing the role played by the inner motivations of individuals in their behavior can lead
to set perverse incentives and unexpected outcomes. Monetary rewards, economic
incentives or other extrinsic consequences like sanctions, or regulations, may hurt in-
trisic motivation. This is the so called crowding-out effect that it is well established
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by behavioral and experimental economics ?, Deci et al. (1999) and Frey and Jegen
(2001).
In our study, doctors, in general, value economic incentives as negative, specially
when these come joint with a notorious absence of recognition. The current profes-
sional career  an incentive scheme implemented in the SNS-O  is considered demo-
tivating by almost all doctors in the interviews mainly because it fails to recognize
effort, quality or excellence of work from other opportunistic behaviors.
Another Fee-For-Service payment scheme known as ‘peonada’ (usually, contract-
ing surgical activity out of hours to reduce the waiting list), is also considered demo-
tivating because it sends a bad signal to doctors about the type of principal and it
changes the frame of the medical act which results in a source of opportunistic be-
haviors. Furthermore, it clearly fails in the goal of reducing waiting lists. ‘Peonada’
is also perceived as an attempt to control the professional activity.
Control over doctors is the other main cause of crowding-out. Doctors are highly
qualified professionals with a high private information. These features make doctors
control averse. Incentives, or organizational issues may demotivate doctors because
they often perceive them as controlling or constraining their autonomy.
On the other face of the picture we have the crowding-in effects. Actions or ex-
ternal rewards  mainly non-monetary but also monetary  which properly designed
may boost agents’ intrinsic motivation. In the study we find few experiences and a
lot of proposals for crowding-in.
We sum up in two the most remarkable experiences. Measures and changes that
provide with more autonomy, more possibilities for doctors to self-manage their own
activity, more participation in the design of objectives and agree upon them, were
the common features of these experiences. In both they stopped making ‘peonadas’
and fixed the rewards to real objectives that involved challenge. Other interesting
characteristics of these experiences were that the decision structure becomes less hi-
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erarchical and more participative and that incentives  often non-economic rewards 
were agreed between doctors and taking into account their hopes, wishes and pro-
fessional goals.
Physicians of the SNS-O made many proposals for incentives. Below we list some
of them:
i.- Facilities to engage in scientific and researching activities: clinical trials, in-
fraestructure, technical assistance, conferences attendance and so on.
ii.- Activities involving professional development: further education, stays in cen-
ters or institutions of excellence to learn new and useful specific knowledge,
teaching and the like.
iii.- More autonomy to organize own work, to self-manage and to set and agree
objectives joint with colleagues and management.
iv.- Recognition at workplace: the necessity of a renewed professional career de-
signed with clear criteria to reward professional excellence.
The last point above might need more exploration. The current professional
career implemented in the SNS-O fails to recognize dedication, professional devel-
opment, excellence or quality of doctors outcomes. It is a source of dissatisfaction
because it rewards equally to all professionals irrespective of their effort, merits or
results. It demotivates the more motivated doctors because they feel an absolut lack
of recognition. A widely shared claim of doctors is to design a new professional ca-
reer which fulfill this objective of rewarding  not necessarily only with money  the
merits, the professional development and quality of outcomes.
Finally, we want to underline that a very common claim from doctors is the need
for politically independent professional managers. If politically designed, managers
have goals far from doctors’ goals. Managers have short term goals, not beyond
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the legislature length and politically focused. Contrary, doctors are career oriented
agents intrinsically motivated for work, with stable long term goals. This divergence
leads managers to design incentives to meet its own objectives but which are far from
being an incentive for doctors. This might be a source of doctors demotivation and
medical staff dissatisfaction.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
5.1 Conclusion
This thesis is a step forward in developing richer models of Behavioral Contract
Theory. Chapter 2 and chapter 3 present models of principal-agent and moral hazard
in which new behavioral assumptions have been included.
In Chapter 2 the notion of identity is introduced in a model of principal agent
with moral hazard. Also we incorporate the principal’s ability to change agents’
identity. Results show the conditions under which spending resources in changing
agents’ identity is profitable for organizations. These conditions are the length of
the contracts (the number of periods that the game is played), the total cost for the
principal of investing in changing agents’ identity, the informative value of the signal
used to observe and incentivize effort, and the degree of agents’ risk aversion.
A change in agents’ identity will result effective to control public organizations
expenditure in the long run despite the initial cost of the investment in motivational
capital. Thus, Governments, political advisors and public organizations should take
this into account and incorporate these findings into policy design. Proposition
1establishes that in the long run, an investment in motivational capital to foster
agents’ identity is the most profitable action for the organization.
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Another interesting conclusion from chapter 2 is that the more noisy is perfor-
mance as a signal of effort, the more profitable is for a principal to change agents’
identity through motivational investments. In other words, the higher the agent rent
extraction power is, the more profitable will be for a principal to have agents with
identity that share organizational goals. This confirms the following,
“[. . . ] a change in identity is the ideal motivator if, [. . . ], effort is
hard to observe or hard to reward ( Akerlof and Kranton (2005), p. 10).
Agent’s risk aversion also affects the profitability of motivational investments. In
presence of risk averse agents more profitable results for a principal to implement
a plan of actions to change agents’ identity and motivate them. Furthermore, the
more risk averse agents are, the more profitable will be to invest in identity for the
organization.
In Chapter 3, the notion of intrinsic motivation is introduced in a model of
principal agent with moral hazard applied to the case of health care organizations.
Also, we incorporate the crowding effects of extrinsic incentives.
Results show that in the long run, to dedicate resources to crowd in doctors
intrinsic motivation, although costly at inception, will be more efficient than the use
of monetary incentives. However, if health care managers are focused on the short
run (legislative period), then they will have a tendency to choose purely monetary
rewards.
A health manager considering to invest or not in motivation will compute the
present value of the expected returns of both alternatives. As long as health manager
has a lower discount factor, more weight will put in the short run and less attractive
will find to invest in doctors’ motivation. This strengthens the previous conclusion.
In the model investments in motivational capital entails depreciation costs. If the
cost of depreciation is so large that the benefit from doctors intrinsic motivation can
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not compensate it, then an investment in doctors’ motivation will not be optimal at
all for the health manager.
Doctors outside options affect positively to the optimality of making investments
in motivational capital. Then, in public health, investments in motivational capital
will be more attractive in those medical specialties which have better outside options
in the private sector.
When doctors are risk-averse, investments in motivational capital are more likely
to be profitable for the health manager. When doctors are intrinsically motivated
they are paid with lower uncertainty to exert high effort and this results in a benefit
for the health manager.
Whenever doctors own a large amount of private information or performance is a
poor signal of effort, then investments in motivational capital are more profitable.This
is particularly interesting because in health, outcomes are hard to measure and often
the factors which determine them are not only doctors’ effort. Furthermore, physi-
cians are highly qualified professionals in areas of advanced and complex knowledge.
As a consequence, they own a large amount of private information. Our results pre-
dict that health organizations are excellent candidates to benefit from motivational
capital investments due to the informational features that characterize them.
Chapter 4 consists in a qualitative research conducted to doctors of the Servicio
Navarro de Salud - Osasunbidea (SNS-O) using semi-structured interviews.
Doctors are intrinsically motivated toward medical practice because they express
to like and enjoy medicine. They are willing to put extra effort in profesional perfor-
mance even in absence of external rewards or in exchange of low ones. Vocation is
another determinant of doctors’ intrinsic motivation. Despite its incidence is lower
than the pleasure from practicing medicine, vocation also makes doctors feel well
from performing at health care.
Doctors’ intrinsic motivation seems to be two-dimensional. Doctors like or en-
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joy from technical or scientific oriented tasks of medical practice, on the one hand,
and also like or enjoy human or patient oriented tasks of medical practice, on the
other. Related with the former, doctors consider medicine as an attractive profes-
sion because it involves activities like research, learning to acquire further education
or technical skills, improving methods and drugs, teaching and so on. The latter
involves the welfare of patients as human beings. In this case, doctors express that
they like or enjoy their work because they help people, they have to empathize with
patients in trouble, they work providing a social valuable good and they view them-
selves as prosocial agents.
With respect to intrinsic motivation, we conclude that doctors motivations to-
wards work and medical practice go beyond the purely economic ones. Therefore
the design of optimal incentive schemes should take into account doctors’ intrinsic
motivation. If principals in health neglect the role played by the intrinsic motivation
of doctors in their behavior, they can be in risk of setting perverse incentives and
having unexpected outcomes.
In our study, doctors, in general, value economic incentives as negative, spe-
cially when these come joint with a notorious absence of recognition. The current
professional career  an incentive scheme implemented in the SNS-O  is considered
demotivating (crowding-out) by almost all doctors in the interviews mainly because
it fails to recognize effort, quality or excellence of work from other opportunistic
behaviors.
Another Fee-For-Service payment scheme known as ‘peonada’ (usually, contract-
ing surgical activity out of hours to reduce the waiting list), is also considered de-
motivating (crowding out) because it sends a bad signal to doctors about the type
of principal and it changes the frame of the medical act which results in a source of
opportunistic behaviors. Furthermore, it clearly fails in the goal of reducing waiting
lists. ‘Peonada’ is also perceived as an attempt to control the professional activity.
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Control over doctors is the other main cause of crowding-out. Doctors are highly
qualified professionals with a high private information. These features make doctors
control averse. Incentives, or organizational issues may demotivate doctors because
they often perceive them as controlling or constraining their autonomy.
On the other face of the picture we have the crowding-in effects. Actions or
external rewards  mainly non-monetary but also monetary  properly designed may
boost agents’ intrinsic motivation. In the study we find few experiences and a lot of
proposals for crowding-in.
We sum up in two the most remarkable experiences. Measures and changes that
provide with more autonomy, more possibilities for doctors to self-manage their own
activity, more participation in the design of objectives and agreement upon them,
were the common features of these experiences. In both they stopped making ‘peon-
adas’ and fixed the rewards to real objectives that involved challenge. Other inter-
esting characteristics of these experiences were that the decision structure becomes
less hierarchical and more participative and that incentives  often non-economic
rewards  were agreed among doctors and taking into account their hopes, wishes
and professional goals.
Physicians of the SNS-O made many proposals for incentives. Below we list some
of them:
i.- Facilities to engage in scientific and researching activities: clinical trials, in-
fraestructure, technical assistance, conferences attendance and so on.
ii.- Activities involving professional development: further education, stays in cen-
ters or institutions of excellence to learn new and useful specific knowledge,
teaching and the like.
iii.- More autonomy to organize own work, to self-manage and to set and agree
objectives joint with colleagues and management.
110
iv.- Recognition at workplace: the necessity of a renewed professional career de-
signed with clear criteria to reward professional excellence.
Finally, we want to underline that a very common claim from doctors is the need
for politically independent professional managers. If politically designed, managers
have goals far from doctors’ goals. Managers have short term goals, not beyond
the legislature length and politically focused. Contrary, doctors are career oriented
agents intrinsically motivated for work, with stable long term goals. This divergence
leads managers to design incentives to meet its own objectives but which are far from
being an incentive for doctors. This might be a source of doctors demotivation and
medical staff dissatisfaction.
5.2 Further Research
A first way in which the research involved in this thesis could be extended, has to do
with theoretical models of chapter 2 and chapter 3. In these models the distribution of
agents according to identity and intrinsic motivation seems to be of high importance
to determine when motivational investments will be optimal for health manager. The
form of these distributions and how socialization and crowding effects affect them, are
crucial to determine the effects produced by incentives  economic or motivational 
on principal’s profits, agents’ utilities and on the total welfare of all the members of
the organization. This is a field that deserves further exploration.
Another possible extension of the theoretical models would be to change the
games from moral hazard to adverse selection. This change may help to explore more
conditions under which a principal could benefit from changing agents’ identity or
fostering their intrinsic motivation. For instance, a lump sum offered to an agent
in case of rejection before she accepts or rejects the contract makes the difference
between a separating or a pooling equilibrium. Comparing these equilibria with the
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pooling equilibrium that occurs after socialization or crowding effects materialize
may throw light about the profitability of making motivational investments.
Introducing group effects into models of chapter 2 and chapter 3 might be an-
other field to explore. It is reasonable to think that the socialization process or
the crowding-in effect may depend on the group behavior, group culture or work
teams composition. How the work group organization is and the diffusion of values
whithin them happens seem to be relevant in the profitability of making investments
to motivate workers.
Another interesting question emerged from theoretical models is that wherever
the principal in the public organization or the health organization are politically
designated, their time horizon will be the legislative time period and then it is more
likely that they focus on the short term goals. Thus, they will have a willingness to
choose pure monetary rewards as incentive schemes, despite in the long term the best
choice is to invest in motivational capital. Workers or doctors are career professionals
whose contracts are much longer that legislative piece of time. This divergence
in the time horizons might be leading the public organizations to internal conflict
environment. Chapter 4 shows evidence pointing out this question and confirms by
the way that this is an interesting question to explore.
From the results of chapter 4 it may be concluded that the current professional
career implemented in the SNS-O fails to recognize dedication, professional develop-
ment, excellence or quality of doctors outcomes. It demotivates the more motivated
doctors because they feel an absolute lack of recognition. A widely shared claim of
doctors is to design a new professional career which fulfill this objective of rewarding
 not necessarily only with money  the merits, the professional development and
quality of outcomes. The design and implementation of a new professional career
taking into account the results of this thesis and after a more in depth research on
this, can be another interesting field to explore.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Appendix: Chapter 2
A.1 Socialization: the Evolution of Identity Distri-
bution.
Let F (tjs0) be the probability distribution function of the As’ identity t, where
t 2 [; ],  <  and ;  2 R+.
Assume that for any decision choice of s0, F0(0jS) = F0(0j0) = F0(0). Social-
ization will reflect evolution of identity distribution through time, conditional to the
choice of s0.
We separate the socialization into two cases: socialization and conflict. The
distribution of identity will evolve oppositely depending on the P ’s s0 investement
strategy.
Thus for every value of t =  when s0 = 0 the distribution function at any
period t is stochastically dominated by the distribution function of the previous
period t   1. Alternatively for every value of t when s0 = S the distribution
function at any period t dominates stochastically the distribution function of the
previous period t  1. This property is formally written as follows,
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Figure A.1: Identity. Stochastic Dominance.
Ft(t = 
j0) > Ft 1(t 1 = j0) >    > F0(0)
>    > Ft 1(t 1 = jS) > Ft(t = jS)
As figure A.1 shows stochastic dominance implies that, regardless of P ’s choice
on s0, for every pair of distribution functions corresponding to different time periods,
they never cross each with the other.
Finally assume that Ft(tjS) converges to put all the probability on the upper
bound of the identity t = , and Ft(tj0) converges to put all the probability on the
lower bound of the identity t = .
lim
t!TS
Ft(tjS) =  where  =

1 if  = 
0 otherwise
for some T S 2 [0;1) and,
lim
t!T 0
Ft(tj0) = 1, for every  2 [; ], and for some T 0 2 [0;1):
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Let Et[tjs0] be the mathematical expectation in t of the value of t conditional
to the incentive policy s0. Implications of the s0 conditioned stochastic dominance
on Et[tjs0]:
8t = 0; 1; :::; T; ::: Et[t+1j0] < Et[tj0]
8t = 0; 1; :::; T; ::: Et+1[t+1jS] > Et[tjS]
8t = 0; 1; :::; T; ::: Et[tj0] < Et[tjS]
Where,
Et[tjs0] =
Z 

tf(tjs0)dt
A.2 Problem Solving
Let us now to simplify the notation in order to make algebraic operations easier. We
relabel some variables of the model in order to do that. All changes are summarized
in table A.1.
Utility from monetary payments: ut(w) = u ; ut(w) = u
Disutility from effort:  t(e; t(s0)) =  t
P ’s revenue function: Rt(q) = R ; Rt(q) = R
P ’s revenue variation: Rt  R R
Payments variability: wSt = wSt   wSt
w0t = w
0
t   w0t
Change of variables: w = h(u) ; w = h(u)
Probability variation:  = (1   0)
Reservation utility: U
Table A.1: Notational simplification
Then we can rewrite the P ’s problem as follows:
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Maxfwt(qt);s0g t 

0
 
R  h(u)  (1  0) (R  h(u))
+ (1  t) 

1
 
R  h(u)  (1  1) (R  h(u))  Ct(s0) (A.1)
Subject to
1u+ (1  1)u   t > 0u+ (1  0)u (ICC) (A.2)
1u+ (1  1)u   t > U (PC) (A.3)
u > 0 (LLC) (A.4)
Note that the P ’s objective function is now strictly concave in u and u, because
h() is strictly convex. The function u 1 = h(u) gives back ex post the monetary
payments from utility levels. We have now linear constraints and a nonempty interior
of the constrained set and therefore the problem is concave and the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are sufficient and necessary for characterizing optimality.
Letting  and  be the non-negative multipliers associated respectively with the
(ICC) and (PC) constraints. First-order conditions of this problem yield:
1
u0(w)
= + 

1
(A.5)
1
u0(w)
=    
1  1 (A.6)
The equations (2.9) and (2.10) jointly with (2.6) and (2.7) form a system of four
equations with four variables (w;w; ; ) which allows us to calculate the solution.
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Multiplying (2.9) by 1 and (2.10) by (1  1) and adding those two modified equa-
tions, we obtain,
 =
1
u0(w)
+
1  1
u0(w)
> 0 (A.7)
Hence,  > 0 and the participation constraint (2.7) is binding. Using (2.11) and
(2.9), we also obtain,
 =
(1  1)1


1
u0(w)
  1
u0(w)

> 0 (A.8)
And the incentive compatibility constraint (2.6) is also binding. Thus we can ob-
tain immediately the values of u(w) and u(w) by solving a system with two equations
and two unknowns. The result is shown below,
ut(w) = U +
(1  0)

 t(e; t(s0)) (A.9)
ut(w) = U   0

 t(e; t(s0)): (A.10)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We want to establish that, in case in which w0T >   S + h(U) always there exists a
threshold t 2 f0; : : : ; T; : : : g for which the following equality holds.
CNV mk =  S    0 = 0 (A.11)
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We can rewrite the above expression in the following way,
CNV mk =
TX
t=0
t
h
ESt   E0t
i
= 0
As we know, in the first period of the game t = 0 the elicit high effort using in-
centive payments that P must offer to elicit A to exert high effort is exactly equal
independently of using socialization incentives (s0 = S) or pure monetary rewards
(s0 = 0). This is so because in the first period neither socialization nor conflict cause
any effect. Therefore, in t = 0 we have that (w00; w00) = (wS0 ; wS0 ) and then we know
that,
CNV mk =
0X
t=0
0
h
ES0   E00
i
=  S < 0
In words, using socialization incentive scheme has negative returns t = 0. But in
subsequent periods t = 1; 2; : : : socialization and conflict processes start to work,
Socialization:
d

iw
S
t + (1  i)wSt

dt
< 0
Conflict:
d

iw
0
t + (1  i)w0t

dt
> 0 for i = 0; 1:
And this means that at t = 1; 2; : : :
dESt
dt
> 0 and
dE0t
dt
< 0;
therefore,
d

ESt   E0t

dt
> 0
Without loss of generality assume that the game reaches the period t = K for which
the processes of socialization (in case that P chooses s0 = S) and conflict (in case that
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P chooses s0 = 0) are completed. Let T S the number of periods necessary for agents
to reach the maximun level of identity due to socialization: TS = . Analogously,
let T 0 the number of periods necessary for agents to reach the minimum level of
identity due to conflict: T 0 = . Then K > T S and K > T 0.
Then at period t = K disutility from effort for an agent with identity K =  will
be zero  K(eK ; ) = 0. This involves that in order to elicit from her high effort the
principal should offer to him a dupla of incentive payments such that wSK = wSK = wSK .
Formally,
wSK = h
0@U + (1  0)


=0z }| {
 K(e; )
1A = h  U = h
0@U   0


=0z }| {
 K(e; )
1A = wSK
Analogously, to incentivize an agent with identity K = , the principal should offer
to him a dupla of incentive payments like the following,
w0K = h
0@U + (1  0)


=	z }| {
 K(e; )
1A = hU + (1  0)

	

w0K = h
0@U   0


=	z }| {
 K(e; )
1A = hU   0

	

We also know that, the probabilities in t = K of having full identity K =  or be
in conflict K = , conditional to s0 = S and s0 = 0 are respectively the following,
PK(K = jS) = 1 and PK(K = j0) = 1;
At this point there is no agent who shirk because the average level of identity, in each
case, matches exactly K =  or K = . Then all the agents within the organization
will have and expected identity level of EK [K jS] =  or EK [K j0] =  respectively.
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All the above lead us to write the P ’s expected profits conditional to chosen
incentives s0 2 f0; Sg:
ESK = 1R + (1  1)R  wSK   S
E0K = 1
 
R  w0K) + (1  1)(R  w0K)
In the following we calculate the difference in expected profits due to selected incen-
tive policies at the point of socialization and conflict effects are completed.
ESK   E0K =
 
1w
0
K + (1  1)w0K
   wSK + S
For proposition 1 we focus our attention in the case of 1w0K+(1 1)w0K > S+h(U).
Also we know that wSK = h(U) and therefore we have,
ESK   E0K =
  >S+h(U)z }| {
1w
0
K + (1  1)w0K
    wSK|{z}
=h(U)
+S

> 0
As we have seen up to this point, CNV mk starts being negative at t = 0. Also
we know that once P ’s selected incentive policy has completed his associated effect,
socialization or conflict, the subsequent added values to the CNV mk will remain
positive period after period up to the game ends. We know also, that socialization
and conflict processes imply that added values to the CNV mk will be increasing in
time. Then at some period t = t^ < K ES
t^
= E0
t^
.
CNV mk =
t^X
t=0
t
h
ES0   E00
i
| {z }
<0
+
>0z }| {
TX
t=t^+1
t
h
ES0   E00
i
Up to t = t^, CNV mk will be decreasing and negative but limited. After the game
overcomes t = t^ and up to t = T , CNV mk will be increasing and limited only by
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the length of the game. That is, the positive value of CNV mk will find its limit
determined by the total number of periods t = T of the game.
Let us to assume the following limited negative value of the current net value of
motivational capital in t = t^,
CNV mk =
t^X
t=0
t
h
ES0   E00
i
=  M where M 2 R++
Assume for simplicity that t^+ 1 = K. Then we have that,
ESK   E0K =
 
1w
0
K + (1  1)w0K
   wSK + S = m where m 2 R++
Then for a discount factor large enough  > M m
M
we have that,
1X
t=K+1
tm M > 0
then at some period t 2 (K;1),
tX
t=K+1
tm M = 0
and therefore CNV mkt = 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Immediate by comparison of (2.10) and (2.18), joint with the application of Propo-
sition 1. Proof available from the authors upon request.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Inmediate. If, at the limit, there is no positive return from changing agents identity at
any period t 2 f0; 1; 2 : : : ; T; : : : g, then the initial investmet never becomes profitable
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and the best choice is to not invest any amount to change agents identity. Proof
available from the authors upon request.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Inmediate. Proof available from the authors upon request.
A.7 Proof of proposition 5.
Preliminary assumptions over i:
P (qt = qjet = e) = 1 P (qt = qjet = e) = 0
P (qt = qjet = e) = 1  1 P (qt = qjet = e) = 1  0
Assume also that performance is an informative signal about effort, 1 > 0.
Results show that the parameter i affects payments wt = fw;wg.
Let us to analyze the impact of 0 on both payments,
ws0t (Et[tjs0]) = h

U +
(1  0)
(1   0) t(e; Et[tjs0])

(A.12)
ws0t (Et[tjs0]) = h

U   0
(1   0) t(e; Et[tjs0])

: (A.13)
By definition h0() > 0 and h00() > 0. Let us to recall  t(e; Et[tjs0]) = 	 to
simplify notation. Then,
dw(q)
d0
= h0(u)
@
 
U   0
1 0 	

@0
=  h0(u)
h 	1
(1   0)2
i
< 0:
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The sign of this first derivative of h(u(w)) from 0 is negative for any value
0 2 [0; 1]. Then the low stochastic payment depends negatively from 0
Now we calculate the second derivative of w from 0,
d2w(q)
d20
=
h
  h00(u) 
 	1
(1   0)2
2i
+ [ h0(u)] 
 2	1
(1   0)3

< 0
The second derivative is negative. Then, the value of the utility experienced from
the low payment, decreases more quickly on 0 as mean as the latter increases. Is
straightforward to se that in the limit the low payment w converges to  1 when 0
goes to 1
lim
0!1
h

U   0	
1   0

=  1
On the other hand, the first derivative on 0 of the high payment is as follows,
dw(q)
d0
= h0(u)  @u(w(q))
@0
= h0(u) 
@

U + (1 0)	
1 0

@0
= h0(u) 	 (1  1)
(1   0)2 > 0
The sign of the first derivative in the case of high payment, is possitive. Then,
as mean as the value of 0 increases, the high payment also increases. The sign of
the second derivative show whether the payment increases faster or slower as mean
as 0 increases.
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Figure A.2: Payments and the informative value of the signal
d2w(q)
d20
=
h
h00(u) 
@

U+
(1 0)	
1 0

@0
i


	 (1 1)
(1 0)2

+
h
h0(u)  2	
(1 1)3
i
=
= h00(u) 

	 (1 1)
(1 0)2
2
+ h0(u)  2	
(1 1)3 > 0
Is straightforward to see that the high payment is increasing in 0 and this positive
relation is also increasing in 0. Then, when 0 value converges to 1, the high
stochastic optimal payment converges to 1.
lim
0!1
h

U +
(1  0)	
1   0

=1 (A.14)
We know that for a given value 0 = ^0 enough close to 1, w will fall below 0.
Then, applying LLC (2.6), for all 0 2 [^0; 1) we have w = 0 and, (A.14).
In the model an agent with t =  experiences no-disutility from effort and he
will not need incentives to exert high effort.
 t(e; ) = 0 (A.15)
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Consequently payments will not depend on the effectiveness of the signal i be-
cause the agent will always choose e = e action in every t in exchange of a constant
payment wSt = h(U). Then,
lim
0!1
h
t 
 
0w
0
t + (1  0)w0t

+ (1  t)
 
1w
0
t + (1  1)w0t
  wSt i =1 (A.16)
and (A.16) proves the proposition 5.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
First let us to recall some assumptions of the model and some properties of functions
of the model. Let us start with  t(et; t). We now that, this function is continuous
and differentiable, and depends negatively on A’s identity
 0 =
@ t(et; t)
@t
< 0 (A.17)
Then, for every pair of agents i = A;B with t;A and t;B identities respectively,
where t;A > t;B whe have that,
 t(e; t;A) = 	A < 	B =  t(e; t;B)
 t(e; t;A) =  t(e; t;B) = 0
As’ identity affects P ’s expected costs,
ECt = t 

0 
h(u)=wz }| {
h

U +
(1  0)
(1   0)   (et; t)

+(1 0) 
h(u=w)z }| {
h

U +
 0
(1   0)   (et; t)

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+(1 t)

1h

U +
(1  0)
(1   0)   (et; t)

| {z }
h(u)=w
+(1 1)h

U +
 0
(1   0)   (et; t)

| {z }
h(u)=w

+Ct(s0)
Let ECrt the P ’s expected cost function when A are risk averse. We differentiate
ECrt with respect to t,
@ECrt
@t
=
t
(1   0) 

0(1  0)  h0(u)   0   0(1  0)  h0(u)   0

+
(1  t)
(1   0) 

1  (1  0)  h0(u)   0   0(1  1)  h0(u)   0

(A.18)
We know that agents are risk averse: u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. The inverse of utility
function h(u(w)) = w is defined in order to calculate payments. By risk aversion we
have that h0 > 0 and h00 > 0. Then for u > u we have that,
h0(u) > h0(u)
Also we know that performance is an informative signal of effort: 1 > 0, and
then 1(1   0) > 0(1   1). Therefore, joint with (A.17), it is straight forward to
see that,
@ECrt
@t
< 0
The interpretation of (A.18) is that as agents’ identity increases, the cost of incen-
tivize them to exert high effort decreases.
Let us now to use as benchmark the risk neutrality case to confront with the
risk aversion case. If agents are risk neutral, then u(w) = k  w with k > 0. Then
u0 = k > 0 and u00 = 0. Let ECnt the P ’s expected cost function when A are risk
neutral. We differentiate ECrt with respect to t,
@ECnt
@t
=
(1  t)
(1   0)  k   
0
  (0   1) (A.19)
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Which is also negative,
@ECnt
@t
< 0
It is immediate to see that the negative effect of the identity on P ’s cost is always
of higher magnitude when agents are risk averse.
@ECrt
@t
 > @ECnt
@t
 (A.20)
And then, in presence of risk averse agents, As’ identity diminishes P ’s expected
costs more than in the case of risk neutral agents.
Next, let us to analyze the consequences of this on CNV mkt . Conditional to P ’s
choice on s0 2 f0; Sg, As’ identity will increase or decrease, and consequently, the
expected costs will decrease or increase along time.
dt(S)
dt
> 0) dECt
dt
< 0
dt(0)
dt
< 0) dECt
dt
> 0
From (A.20) we know that,
d[ECrt ]
dt
 > d[ECnt ]
dt
) d[Ert ]
dt
>
d[Ent ]
dt
if s0 = S
d[ECrt ]
dt
>
d[ECnt ]
dt
)
d[Ert ]
dt
 > d[Ent ]
dt
 if s0 = 0
And,
CNV mk;rt > CNV
mk;n
t
For every t = 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : as we want to proof.
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Appendix B
Mathematical Appendix: Chapter 3
B.1 Stochastic Dominance
Crowding effects move the distribution of doctors intrinsic motivation with a stochas-
tic dominance. Then for any fixed value of t =  we have,
Ft(t = 
jwt; 0) > Ft 1(t 1 = jwt 1; 0) >    > F0(0)
>    > Ft 1(t 1 = jwt 1; S) > Ft(t = jwt; S)
Assume that Ft(1jwt; S) converges to the upper bound of intrinsic motivation t = 
and that Ft(1jwt; 0) converges to the lower bound of intrinsic motivation t = 0.
lim
t!1
Ft(tjwt; S) =  in which  =

1 if t = 
0 otherwise
and
lim
t!1
Ft(tjwt; 0) = 1, for every t 2 [0;]:
Let Et[js0; wt] be the mathematical expectation in t of the value of t given the
incentive policy s0 and incentives wt. Consequently, stochastic dominance on Et[tj]
assumes:
8t = 0; 1; :::; T; ::: Et+1[t+1jwt+1; 0] < Et[tjwt; 0]
8t = 0; 1; :::; T; ::: Et+1[t+1jwt+1; S] > Et[tjwt; S]
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8t = 0; 1; :::; T; ::: Et[tjwt; 0] < Et[tjwt; S]
In which:
Et[tjwt; s0] =
Z 
0
tf(tjwt; s0)dt
B.2 Proof of Proposition 7
We have to study the sign of the following expression:
 S    0 =
TX
t=0
t
h
t 

0
 
Rt   wSt

+ (1  0)
 
Rt   wSt
 
+(1  t) 

1
 
Rt   wSt

+ (1  1)
 
Rt   wSt
 i
 
TX
t=0
t
h
t

0
 
Rt   w0t

+ (1  0)
 
Rt   w0t
 
+(1  t)

1
 
Rt   w0t

+ (1  1)
 
Rt   w0t
 i  TX
t=0
tCt(S)
We have to show that there is a given threshold t 2 t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : : such that,
 S    0 = 0
Crowding effects, stochastic dominance, and (3.39) imply that for all t^ 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T; : : : g
such that t^ > t0 and t^ > tS, the following condition holds,
ESt^   E0t^ > 0
As we know in t = 0,
ES0   E00 < 0
Then there exists a t such that 0 < t < t^ in which,
ESt = E
0
t (B.1)
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and then,
tX
t=0
h
ESt   E0t
i
< 0 (B.2)
TX
t=t
h
ESt   E0t
i
> 0 (B.3)
where (B.2) results in a negative and finitely bounded value and (B.3) is unbounded
and only finds its limit when the game ends. Formally,
tX
t=0
h
ESt   E0t
i
=  M (B.4)
lim
t!1
1X
t=t
h
ESt   E0t
i
=1 (B.5)
From (B.1) and (B.5) we now that there exists a t 2 ft+ 1; : : : ; T; : : : g such that,
tX
t=t
h
ESt   E0t
i
= M
And therefore the following holds,
 S    0 = 0
B.3 Proof of Proposition 8
Immediate. The analogous case of proposition 1. Proof available from the authors
upon request.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 9
Using (13), (14) and h(u) : u  ! w we have that incentive payments are,
wt = h

U   E[tjwt; s0] +

(1  0)=

	

(B.6)
wt = h

U   E[tjwt; s0] 

0=

	

: (B.7)
From (45) and (46) we now that for any pair of expected values of intrinsic motivation
1; 2 2 (wt; s0) such that 1 > 2 we have that,
w1t = h

U   1 +

(1  0)=

	

< h

U   2 +

(1  0)=

	

= w2t (B.8)
w1t = h

U   1  

0=

	

< h

U   2  

0=

	

= w2t : (B.9)
Assume first that agents are risk neutral to set a benchmark case. That is to say
that ut(wt) = wt. Then P will pay lower incentives to the higher motivated A,
w1t   w2t = 2   1
w1t   w2t = 2   1 if w1t > 0 and w2t > 0
w1t   w2t =  where  = U   2  

0=

	 if w1t = 0 and w
2
t > 0
w1t   w2t = 0 if w1t = 0 and w2t = 0
In the model agents are risk-averse, h0 > 0 and h00 > 0. Then for the cases above we
have that,
h

U   1 +

(1  0)=

	

  h

U   2 +

(1  0)=

	

> 2   1
h

U   1  

0=

	

  h

U   2  

0=

	

> 2   1 if w1t > 0 and w2t > 0
h

U   2  

0=

	

> U   2  

0=

	 if w1t > 0 and w
2
t = 0
0 if w1t = 0 and w
2
t = 0
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and then, the costs saved by P because As are intrinsically motivated are higher
when agents are risk averse and therefore CNV mkt will earlier reach a positive value.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 10
We proof the proposition 10 in two steps.
i.-
h
w0t  wSt +1(w0 wS)
i
>
h
1(w
0 wS)
i
and condition (3.39) becomes
harder to hold than in the case of U > 0 and having a CNV mk < 0 for all
t = 1; 2; ::: is more likely.
ii.- For the case in which (3.39) holds, reasoning as in the proof of proposition 3,
it is straightforward to see that w0t   wSt is the unique source of savings for P
and in any case will be lower (as much equal if LLC applies) than in the case
of U > 0. So thus, CNV mkt will become positive earlier when U > 0.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 11
By (13) and (14) we know that,
ut = U   t (wt; s0) + (1  0)

	
ut = U   t (wt; s0) 
0

	:
Applying function h(u) = w in order to calculate payments we have that,
wt = h

U   t (wt; s0) + (1  0)

	

(B.10)
wt = h

U   t (wt; s0)  0

	

: (B.11)
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Differentiating (B.10) and (B.11) with respect to 0 we have,
@wt
@0
= h0(ut)  (1  1)
(1   0)2 	 > 0 (B.12)
@wt
@0
=  h0(ut) 
1
(1   0)2 	 < 0: (B.13)
and then higher 0 implies higher wt and lower wt. Differentiating (51) and (52) with
respect to t we have that,
@2wt
@0@t
=  h00(ut)  (1  1)
(1   0)2 	 < 0 (B.14)
@2wt
@0@t
= h00(ut) 
1
(1   0)2 	 > 0 (B.15)
Interpreting the signs of (B.12) and (B.14) we have that, as mean as higher is A’s
intrinsic motivation, an increase of same magnitude in 0 provokes an increase in wt
of lower magnitude. From the signs of (B.13) and (B.15) we interpret that as mean
as higher is A’s intrinsic motivation, an increase of equal magnitude in 0 provokes
an decrease in wt of lower magnitude. Let LLC0 2 (0; 1) be the minimun value of 0
such that LLC is applied. Then we have that,
@wt
@0

0>LLC0
= 0
This establishes that, for higher values of 0 the benefits from choosing s0 = S come
only from the lower impact the higher 0 has on wt when agents intrinsic motivation
is higher. Thus, with 0 more close to 1 more intrinsically motivated agents imply
higher values of CNV mkt for every t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; T; : : :
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Appendix C
Appendix: Chapter 4
C.1 Codification
Codes related with intrinsic motivation and crowding effects are explained. Sev-
eral tables in this section show a list of codes concerning to Intrinsic motivation,
Crowding-out and Crowding-in including the code name, the category the code is
related to, the code type: deductive, inductive oandr in-vivo. Finally a brief expla-
nation of the code and some argumentation about why the code is related with the
proposed category is shown.
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Intrinsic Motivation and Crowding Effects: codes.
Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Agree objectives Crowding in Inductive
A form of autonomy. Setting organi-
zational goals jointly between agents
and principal motivates for work.
Altruism Intrinsic moti-vation Deductive/Inductive
The willingness to help others al-
though this carries a cost. A the-
oretical concept but also emerged
from situations described by doc-
tors.
Attractive
profession
Intrinsic moti-
vation inductive
Doctors’ statements mostly shown
some perception about medical
practice as an attractive activity,
profession or task. We consider all
those statements as evidence of in-
trinsic motivation and we capture
all of them into attractive profession
code.
Autonomy Crowding in Deductive
In DeCharms (1968) the need for
autonomy is considered, joint with
the need for competence, the ba-
sis for intrinsic motivation. Re-
search on intrinsic motivation Deci
and Ryan (1985), Deci et al. (1999),
have shown the benefits of support-
ing autonomy for motivated persis-
tence, performance, and wellbeing.
Bureaucratization Crowding out Inductive/In-vivo
Emerged from participants. ‘Bu-
reaucratization’ reflect the idea that
there is a proportion of acommo-
dated doctors with high degree of
conformism. Suffering from bureau-
cratization doctors give up in the
pursuit of their professional goals.
The consequence of achieving a safe
position ironcladed by a bulletproof
contract. The result of being pol-
luted by the absence of professional
incentives.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Challenge Intrinsic motivation Deductive
SDT in Deci and Ryan (1985), Deci
and Ryan (2000a), Deci and Ryan
(2000b) and Deci et al. (1999) show
that intrinsically motivated people
is moved to act for the fun or chal-
lenge entailed rather than because
of external prods, pressures, or re-
wards. Intrinsic motivation is in
part the human inherent tendency
to seek out challenges, to develop
one’s capacities to explore and to
learn.
‘Coffee for all’ Crowding out Inductive/In-vivo
Emerges from respondents. ‘Coffee
for all’ is a cliche used by doctors to
refer to the equal treatment received
for all professionals independently of
their individual effort, merits or pro-
fessional excellence. It is used in a
pejorative sense to explain the lack
of recognition suffered by doctors
from management. Closely related
with crowding out.
Control Crowding out Deductive
The opposite of autonomy. Rewards
and external regulation in general
act as extrinsic motivators which
externally control people’s behav-
ior. People behave to attain a de-
sired consequence such as tangible
rewards or to avoid a threatened
punishment. This type of extrinsic
motivation has been extensively ex-
amined and found to be undermin-
ing of intrinsic motivation Deci et al.
(1999).
Damage to
pro-social
image
Crowding out Deductive
MCT Frey (1997), Frey and Jegen
(2001) and Behavioral economics
Bowles (2008), Bowles and Polanía-
Reyes (2012), establish that reputa-
tion is a non-economic motivation
when people act following their in-
trinsic motives. In the provision
of social valuable goods agents wish
to view themselves as a social goal
oriented. Money and rewards can
hurt this self-view undermining peo-
ple intrinsic motivation.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Dedication Intrinsic moti-vation Inductive
Dedication label situations in which
good medical practice involves per-
sonal costs. Doctors refer to some of
this situations. Explicitly and also
implicitly.
Economic Incentives Crowding out Deductive
Literature from economic theory
Benabou and Tirole (2003), Bowles
and Polanía-Reyes (2012), Frey and
Jegen (2001), and from psychology
Deci (1971), Deci et al. (1999) has
shown that the use of monetary or
material rewards to incentive work-
ers undermine intrinsic motivation.
Effort Intrinsic moti-vation Inductive
Doctors frequently underline situa-
tions in which they have to put ex-
tra effort, out of hours and with-
out any reward linked. They com-
mit to do that following some sense
of duty or ethical values. They de-
scribe these situations as inherent
to the medicine and something that
one know before becoming doctor.
Empathy Intrinsic moti-vation Inductive
Empathy and the ability to em-
pathize is a crucial characteristic
that all physicians consider a good
doctor should have and from which
they get satisfaction. This charac-
teristic refers to the ability to put
yourself (doctor) in the shoes of oth-
ers (patients) and feel their prob-
lems or discomfort as own.
Flexibility Crowding-in Inductive
More flexible rules at workplace, in
work and tasks organization, or in
the management of the organization
in general and of the consultation in
particular.
Further education
Intrinsic
motivation/
Crowding in
Inductive
Respondents when openly talk
about the features and dimensions
of the medical practice that they
enjoy the most they point out some
specific aspects. Further education
and the posibility to aquire and
learn new knowledge was quoted by
almost all of them.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Help Intrinsic motivation Inductive
This code emerges from respon-
dents’ statements. They view them-
selves as people who help others and
contribute this way to the social wel-
fare. This way to behave and feeling
to be effective in doing so is consid-
ered an internal reward inherent to
the medical practice.
Humanity Intrinsic moti-vation Inductive
Often mostly respondents, when
speaking about their likings and
their expectatives from becominng
and being doctors, said that service
and the human touch involved by
the profession is one of the most
valuable reward inherent to medical
practice. We capture these state-
ments under humanity code.
Lack of autonomy Crowding out Deductive
SDTDeci and Ryan (2000a), Deci
et al. (1999), establish that auton-
omy in work decision taking is an
important source of intrinsic mo-
tivation. Whenever management
practices and implemented incen-
tives and command and control
policies are autonomy constraining,
they may cause crowding out.
Lack of recognition Crowding out Deductive
SDT Deci et al. (1999) establish that
recognition or being recognized by
ones effort or achievement is a more
effective incentive than the mone-
tary for activities that individuals
perform by the mere fact of enjoy-
ment. Analogously the lack of any
recognition undermines individuals
intrinsic motivation to perform in
any activity.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Like/Enjoy Intrinsic motivation Deductive
Classical definitions of intrinsic mo-
tivation Deci and Ryan (1985), Deci
and Ryan (2000b), say that indi-
viduals are intrinsically motivated
when they get satisfaction (utility)
from the very act of doing a given
activity or performing in a task. In-
trinsically motivated activities were
defined as those that individuals
find interesting and would do in the
absence of operationally separable
consequences.
Non-economic
incentives Crowding in Inductive
Emerged from respondents and data
collection. This code collects all
mentioned forms of non-monetary
rewards which would be welcoed by
physicians to improve their work.
Market trans-
action Crowding out Deductive
Coming from MCT and SDT.
Closely related with Change in task
view. After being rewarded with
money people start to understand
their work activity and effort as a
commodity that trade by a price.
Once they swift this view of the ac-
tivity intrinsic motivation is under-
mined.
Opportunistic
behavior Crowding out Deductive
Coming from Game Theory oppor-
tunistic behavior is an expression
conventionally used to refer such
player’s actions driven by the goal of
seeking his own maximun material
benefit by gaming the system or the
rules, Bowles (2008), Frey and Jegen
(2001), LeGrand (2006). This kind
of behaviors in health is considered
as a consequence of crowding out of
doctors intrinsic motivation plus the
huge amount of the private informa-
tion they have performing in their
positions.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Passion Intrinsic moti-vation Inductive
Doctors in many of their explana-
tions explicitly. Other times passion
is implicitly present in the discourse
when they passionately talk about
something related to their work: a
new treatment or a surgery tech-
nique for instance.
‘Peonada’ Crowding out Inductive/In vivo
Emerged from respondents and
data collection. The code Peon-
ada’ refers to a certain Fee-For-
Service (FFS) incentive practice im-
plemented in the Sistema Navarro
de Salud-Osasunbidea. Is considered
an ‘In vivo’ code because its name
exactly matches with the expresion
used by interviewees. This code
appears closely related to crowding
out.
Prestige Intrinsic moti-vation Inductive
Often, in the course of interviews,
doctors speak about prestige mat-
ters emerge as internal rewards dif-
ferent from money.
Professional
development
Intrinsic
motivation/
Crowding in
deductive
Asked about what they expect from
medical practice, doctors often point
out the possibility to develop a pro-
fessional career. Career concerns,
prestige and professional recogni-
tion also are shown as incentives by
physicians. This fact keeps consis-
tent with the model of career con-
cerns proposed by citedht, Dewa-
tripont et al. (1999b).
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Professional
Career Crowding out/in Inductive
Professional career is an ex-
isting incentive scheme in the
SNS. Although it is a non-
economicincentive, doctors perceive
consider it to cause crowding out.
They view professional career as
a disguised wage increase very
easy to achieve for every doctor.
An element that no recognizes
neither merit nor effort. In these
cases appears as an evidence of
crowding out and also as a positive
code. Other times doctors’ mention
professional career as it should be.
As a normative code. in these cases
they say that professional career
should differentiate professionals
who work hard and accumulate
merits from the rest.
Pro-social Intrinsic moti-vation Deductive
Pro-social behavior and social pref-
erences have been object of research
within behavioral economics Ben-
abou and Tirole (2006), Camerer
(2003) and Fehr et al. (2007). Proso-
cial behavior often involves inter-
nal non-material rewards and mate-
rial costs as doctors describe to fre-
quently happen in public health ser-
vice.
Recognition Crowding in Deductive
Deci (1971), Deci and Ryan (1985)
pointed out that giving people unex-
pected positive feedback on a task
increases people’s intrinsic motiva-
tion to do it. This was because the
positive feedback was fulfilling peo-
ple’s need for competence. Recog-
nition (social, patient, or employer)
was claimed by respondents in the
study as a non-material reward that
enforce professionals’ sense of com-
petence and encourage physicians to
high effort and high quality stan-
dars.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Relatedness
Intrinsic
motivation/
Crowding in
Deductive
Theory and research suggest that
relatedness, joint with competence
and autonomy, plays a role in the
maintenance of intrinsic motivation
Deci and Ryan (2000a). Relatedness
captures the idea that people’s effort
and achieved outcome is strongly
correlated. SDT hypothesizes that
intrinsic motivation will be more
likely to flourish in contexts charac-
terized by a sense of secure related-
ness Ryan and LaGuardia (2000).
Research
Intrinsic
motivation/
Crowding in
Inductive
This code captures all the state-
ments that point out the impor-
tance that research has for doctors.
Research is considered of very im-
portance by physicians because new
medical knowledge improves quality
of service, patients expectatives of
sanation, citicens health and social
welfare. Further doctors consider re-
search as a challenge overcoming ac-
tivity and they find it enjoyable by
its own. Then facilitating research
is viewed as a non-economic reward
that highly motivates for work.
Science
Intrinsic
motivation/
Crowding in
Inductive
Respondents frequently mentioned
that scientific knowledge, scientific
advance, and science related issues
are in the basin of their interest
and likings toward medical profes-
sion. Under science we have cap-
tured all these doctors’ motives. Sci-
entific adavance oriented incentives
also are asked by respondents and
considered as crowding in in many
times.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Service Intrinsic motivation inductive
Doctors mostly afirm that service
and patient care were one of the
main motives at the moment they
decide to become physicians. After
they spent many years of medical
practice they confirm this view and
they still believe that patient care is
one of the most interesting and emo-
tional dimension of being a doctor.
Task Meaning
Change Crowding out Deductive
Self determination Theory (SDT)
Deci and Ryan (1985), Deci and
Ryan (2000a), Deci and Ryan
(2000b), and Motivation Crowd-
ing Theory (MCT), Frey (1997),
Frey and Jegen (2001), Bowles and
Polanía-Reyes (2012), both estab-
lish that one main reason for crowd-
ing out is that once the money en-
ter as an exyternal reward for the
performed activity, people switch
their perception of performing in
this task from the pure joy to a
mean of achievement of material re-
wards. After that change of percep-
tion people only are willing to effort
in the activity when some reward is
expected as a consequence.
Technical
knowledge
Intrinsic moti-
vation Inductive
Respondents when openly talk
about the motives by which they
decide to become doctors, they
point out some aspects of the
medical practice. One of the most
quoted of these was the technical
dimension of medicine.
Vocation Intrinsic motivation Inductive
Emerged from interviews and data
collection. It was frequently high-
lighted by respondents as key factor
oin the choice of proffession.
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